The Paris Attach - a case for the right to self-defence? by Hözel, Jana
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
The Paris attack - A case for the right to self-defence? 
 
 
      
Submitted by: 
Jana Hözel, Augustastraße 29, 41464 Neuss, Germany 
(HZLJAN001) 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Cathleen Powell, Department of Public Law, University of Cape 
Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch, 7701 
 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of 
the requirements for the LL.M. by Coursework in approved courses and a minor 
dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the 
completion of a programme of courses. 
I hereby declare that I have read and understand the regulations governing the 
submission of LL.M. by coursework dissertations, including those relating to 
lengths and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this 
dissertation conforms to those regulations.  
Cape Town, 15 February 2017 
 
--- 
Word Count: 22.937 (excluding table of contents, abbreviations and bibliography)
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
I 
 
 Table of Contents 
Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………... IV-VI 
 
A. Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………. ………1 
B. Chapter 2: The right to self-defence…………………………………………... 4 
I. Development of the right to self-defence……………………………… 4 
II. Requirements of the right to self-defence………………………………6 
III.  Statehood of the Islamic State…………………………………………. 8 
1. Permanent population……………………………………………….. 9 
2. Defined territory………………………………………………………. 10 
3. Effective government………………………………………………….12 
4. The capacity to enter into relations with the other states……........14 
IV. Interim Conclusion…………………………………………………………17 
C. Chapter 3: The traditional approach: Attribution to Syria…………………….18 
I. Attribution according to the ILC-Draft Articles………………………… 18 
1. Art. 5 of the ASR………………………………………………………18 
2. Art. 4 of the ASR……………………………………………...............18 
3. Art. 11 of the ASR……………………………………………………..19 
4. Art. 10 of the ASR……………………………………………………..19 
5. Art. 9 of the ASR…………………………………………….............. 20 
6. Art. 8 of the ASR………………………………………………………21 
a. The ‘effective control-test’………………………………………..22 
b. The ‘overall control-test’…………………………………………. 22 
II 
 
c. Interim Conclusion……………………………………………….. 22 
II. Attribution according to the Safe Haven-Doctrine…………….............24 
III. Attribution according to the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine……........... 25 
1. The content of the doctrine………………………………………….. 25 
2. A rule of customary international law?...........................................26 
IV. Interim Conclusion……………………………………………………….. 37 
D. Chapter 4: A new interpretation of the rules of attribution……………………38 
I. Emergence of a new legal framework after 9/11?.............................. 38 
1. Effect of the SC Resolutions 1368, 1373 and 1438………………..38 
2. Jurisprudence of the ICJ as of 2001…………………………………41 
3. Interim Conclusion…………………………………………………….42 
II. Does the current status of international law meet  
today’s challenges?............................................................................ 42 
 
III. A new standard of attribution…………………………………………….44 
1. Shortcomings of the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine………..............44 
2. A new approach: a clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine.............45 
a. Obligations under international law…………………………….. 48 
b. Definition of inability……………………………………………… 50 
c. Definition of unwillingness………………………………………..52 
d. Interim Conclusion……………………………………………….. 52 
3. The tension between the right to self-defence of the  
attacked state and the territorial sovereignty of the  
host state……………………………………………………………….53 
 
a. Relevant preconditions for the defensive use of force……….. 53 
aa. Unilateral military action as means of last resort…………. 54 
III 
 
bb. Chances of success of self-defence action……………….. 56  
cc. Existence of convincing evidence…………………………...57 
dd. Awareness of the host state…………………………………59  
b. Interim Conclusion………………………………………............. 61 
E. Chapter 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………….. 62 
 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………. 65-75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
IV 
 
Abbreviations 
Art. Article 
ASR Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 
Cf. Confer (lat.) 
Etc. Etcetera 
EU European Union 
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
GA General Assembly 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ILC International Law Commission 
IS Islamic State 
Lit. Litera (lat.) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
No.  Number 
OAS Organization of American States 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe 
Para. Paragraph 
PKK Kurdish Worker’s Party; Kongra-Gel 
SC Security Council 
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
TEU Treaty on the European Union 
V 
 
UN United Nations  
UNC United Nations Charter 
US United States 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 
1 
 
A) Chapter 1: Introduction 
On the evening of Friday 13 November 2015 ten terrorists killed 130 people and injured 
further 368 people during a coordinated attack in Paris. The terrorist organisation IS 
claimed responsibility for the attack.1  
The attack was mostly planned and masterminded in Syria and some of the terrorists 
had undergone terrorist training by the IS in Syria.2  
French President Francois Hollande declared that ‘France is at war’3. On the 16 
November, as a direct reaction to the attack, France launched massive air strikes 
against the IS stronghold in Raqqa, Syria.4 The operation was carried out in 
coordination with the US military. French Minister of Foreign Affairs and International 
Development at that time, Laurent Fabius, said that the retaliatory air strikes were an 
act of ‘self-defence’.5  
Further reactions in Europe were in line with that statement. Although France did not 
request the use of the alliance's mutual defence clause in Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty, 
many NATO allies offered France help.6  
France did invoke Art. 42 para. 7 of the TEU though and requested military aid from the 
other member states of the EU.7 
                                                          
1 Rukmini Callimachi, New York Times, ‘ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks “First of the 
Storm’”, 14.11.2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-
responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles.html?_r=0 (accessed on: 30.08.2016). 
2 BBC News, 27.24.2016, ‘Paris attacks: who were the attackers?’, available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512 (accessed on: 30.08.2016). 
3 Speech of the French President Francois Hollande, 16.11.2015, available at: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/parisattacks-paris-terror-attacks-
november-2015/article/speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-before-a-joint-session-of-parliament 
(accessed on: 30.08.2016). 
4 Ben Doherty, The Guardian, ‘France launches “massive” airstrike on Isis stronghold of Raqqa’, 
16.11.2015, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/france-launches-massive-
airstrike-on-isis-stronghold-in-syria-after-paris-attack (accessed on: 30.08.2016). 
5 Speech of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, 15.11.2015, available at: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/events/debate-on-foreign-policy-in-the-
senate/article/speech-of-laurent-fabius-minister-of-foreign-affairs-and-international (accessed on: 
30.08.2016). 
6 Steven Erlanger & Peter Baker, New York Times, ‘For France, an Alliance against ISIS may be easier 
said than done’, 18.11.2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/europe/for-france-an-
alliance-against-isis-may-be-easier-said-than-done.html?_r=0 (accessed on: 30.08.2016). 
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Art. 42 para. 7 of the TEU contains the so called ‘solidarity clause’ that states that if a 
member of the EU is the victim of ‘armed aggression on its territory’ other states have 
an ‘obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.’8  
Art. 42 para. 7 of the TEU is similar to Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty which the US activated 
after the attack on 11th September 2001, to trigger the US-led alliance's intervention in 
Afghanistan.  
It was the first time that a member state invoked Art. 42 para. 7 of the TEU.9 
But no matter which political way France chose, legally it all comes down to the right of 
self-defence, as laid down in Art. 51 of the UNC. 
For a long time it was the prevailing view in international law that the right to self-
defence requires, inter alia, an armed attack by a state. In the present case there was 
no armed attack by another State. The attack was carried out by a terrorist organisation. 
This fact raises the issue whether French air strikes against the IS in Syria really can be 
classified as an act of self-defence or does France or the USA violate the prohibition on 
the use of force, set out in Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC, by carrying out these air strikes? 
The present dissertation deals with this issue and clarifies the circumstances under 
which a state that got attacked by terrorists can exercise its right to self-defence against 
another state that is hosting –willingly or unwillingly- these terrorists. 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. 
Chapter two I first describes the development of the right to self-defence. Furthermore it 
outlines the current legal framework of the right to self-defence. The explanations refer 
to the customary right of self-defence as well as to the treaty right. In this context, the 
question is raised whether or not, the IS is a state under international law. In order to 
render a solution in form of a legal classification of the IS all four criteria of Art. 1 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Ian Traynor, The Guardian, ‘France invokes EU's article 42.7, but what does it mean?’, 17.11.2015 
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/france-invokes-eu-article-427-what-does-it-
mean (accessed on: 30.08.2016) [Traynor]. 
8 Daniel Thym in Blanke&Mangiameli (eds), The Treaty on the European Union (TEU); A Commentary 
(Heidelberg New York London, 2013), Art. 42 (7), para. 17.  
9 Traynor supra note 7 (accessed on: 30.08.2016). 
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Montevideo Convention10 and are applied and the concept of recognition in international 
law is discussed. 
Chapter three introduces the classical view in international law regarding attribution. 
This approach requires an armed attack carried out by a state or alternatively an armed 
attack that is attributable to a state. Therefore I will analyse if the attack in Paris can be 
attributed to Syria. In doing so, several approaches and ideas will be addressed, inter 
alia the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts11 
as well as the Safe Haven-Doctrine and the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine, whereby the 
focus will lie on the last mentioned doctrine. I will have a look at its content and analyse 
if the doctrine is already a rule of customary international law.  
In chapter four I will discuss a new interpretation of the rules of attribution focusing on 
the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine. I will examine if, under current international law, an 
armed attack in the sense of Art. 51 of the UNC can be carried out by a non-state actor 
without attribution to a state. This debate came up after the attacks of 9/11 in 2001. For 
this purpose I will analyse the SC resolutions 1368, 1373 and 1438 as well as ICJ 
jurisprudence after 2001. Furthermore, if attribution to a state is still required, I will show 
that the traditional standard of attribution is not able to deal effectively with today’s 
threats. Because of that, the rules of attribution have to be interpreted in new way. The 
basis for that should be the clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine with a clear legal 
content and defined parameters.  
Finally my conclusion is outlined in chapter five. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19; 49 Stat 3097 (26 December 
1933) [Montevideo Convention]. 
11 ‘Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, Report of the ILC on the Work 
of its fifty-third session, UNGAOR, 56th Sess., Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001), 
Volume I, Part II, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
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B) Chapter 2: The right to self-defence  
I. Development of the right to self-defence 
Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC12 comprises the prohibition on the use of force of one state 
against another state. This norm constitutes the cardinal norm of public international 
law.13 There have been attempts to restrict the scope of Art. 2 para.4 of the UNC due to 
its wording.14 Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC speaks of force against the ‘territorial integrity’, 
the ‘political independence’ or ‘in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the UN’. According to this argument, actions that are not aimed against one of these 
legally protected rights are not covered by the prohibition on the use of force and do not 
constitute a violation of Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC.  
The ICJ rejected this line of argument in Corfu Channel.15 Apart from that, the travaux 
préparatoires of the article, which, according to Art. 32 of the VCLT16, ought to be 
consulted as supplementary means of interpretation, show that the words ‘territorial 
integrity’ and ‘political independence’ were inserted later only under the urging of 
smaller states in order to highlight violations of a particular gravity.17 Furthermore, Art. 2 
para. 4 of the UNC serves the purpose18 to reduce the unilateral use of military force.19 
So, under the UNC there are only two undisputed exceptions to Art. 2 para. 4 of the 
UNC. The use of force is permitted only if it is authorised by the SC according to 
chapter VII or in self-defence, Art. 51 of the UNC.20  
                                                          
12 Charter of the United Nations, 15 U.N.C.I.O. 335 (26 June 1945). 
13 Cassese ‘International Law’ (Oxford 2005), p. 100 [Cassese]; Brierly ‘The Law of Nations’ (Oxford, 
1963), p. 414 [Brierly] 
14 See for this argument: Brownlie ‘Principles of Public International Law’ (Oxford 2008), p. 732 [Brownlie]. 
15 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment of April 9th 
1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4 at p. 35 [Corfu Channel].  
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (23 May 1969). 
17 Randelzhofer in Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, Vol. I (New York, 
2002), Art. 2 (4), para. 36 [author in UN-Commentary]. 
18 According to Art. 31 para. 1 VCLT a treaty shall be interpreted in its context and in the light of its object 
and purpose. 
19 Randelzhofer in UN-Commentary supra note 17,  Art. 51, para. 4; Gazzini, ‘The changing rules on the 
use of force in international law’ (Manchester 2005), p. 127. 
20 Randelzhofer in UN-Commentary supra note 17, Art. 51, para.3; Bennett/Strug ‘Introduction to 
International Law’ (Juta 2013), pp. 322f [Bennett/Strug].  
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The attacked state itself can carry out the self-defence action or another state can help 
the attacked state. The former case is referred to as individual self-defence whereas the 
latter case is known as collective self-defence.21  
As Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC has to be interpreted broadly, both cases of self-defence, 
which constitute an exception to the prohibition on the use of force, have to be 
interpreted strictly.22  
According to the traditional definition, a state has ‘[…] to show a necessity of self-
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation’.23 And it has to do ‘[…] nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, 
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept 
clearly within it.’24 This definition was the result of the Caroline case which is seen as 
the leading case on the customary law of self-defence.25  
The treaty right to self-defence in Art. 51 of the UNC provides that:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
There have been discussions about the extent of the customary right to self-defence on 
the one hand and the treaty right under Art. 51 of the UNC on the other hand. Some 
authors were of the opinion that Art. 51 of the UNC was exhaustive26 whereas others 
                                                          
21 Bothe in Vitzthum (ed), Völkerrecht (Berlin, 2010), para. 19 [author in Vitzthum ]; Cassese, supra note 
13, pp. 312-313. 
22 Chainoglou, ‘Reconceptualising Self-Defence in International Law’ (2007) 18 KLJ 61 at 68. 
23 Caroline case, 29 BFSP 1137-8 and 30 BFSP 195 [Caroline]. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Bennett/Strug, supra note 20, p. 332; Shaw ‘International Law’ (Cambridge, 2008), p. 1131 [Shaw]. 
26 McDougal, ‘The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense’ (1963) 57 AJIL 597 at 600; Moore, ‘The 
Secret War in Central America and the Future of the World Order’ (1986) 80 AJIL 43 at 83; Kelsen ‘The 
Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problem’ (London 1950), p.914 [Kelsen]. 
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claimed that the customary right to self-defence goes beyond the one laid down in Art. 
51 of the UNC as this applies only to situations of an armed attack.27 
In Nicaragua the ICJ clearly stated: 
[…] Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a "natural" 
or "inherent" right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of 
a customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced 
by the Charter [….] It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision which 
"subsumes and supervenes" customary international law.28 
 
II. Requirements of the right to self-defence 
In Nicaragua the ICJ also ruled that the right to self-defence requires an armed attack 
by another state on the victim state.29 Unfortunately it did not give a definition of an 
armed attack.  
The Court did state though that ‘the most grave forms of the use of force’30 constitute an 
armed attack. Additionally it said: 
[…] an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by 
regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the sending by or 
on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount 
to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, "or its 
substantial involvement therein".31  
Moreover only force of particular scale and effects can be considered an armed attack 
‘rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed 
forces’.32 
Furthermore, the actions taken in self-defence must be necessary and proportionate.33 
‘Self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack 
                                                          
27 Randelzhofer in UN-Commentary supra note 17, Art. 51, paras. 7-9 ; Brierly, supra note 13, pp. 417-
418. 
28 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Judgment on the Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p.14 at para. 176 [Nicaragua]. 
29 Ibid. at paras. 193, 195. 
30 Ibid. at para. 191. 
31 Ibid. at para. 195. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. at paras. 194, 237. 
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and necessary to respond to it.’34 So a state may act in self-defence when there is a 
strong necessity to defend itself. Additionally, the defensive use of force must not be 
unreasonable or excessive.35 In this regard particular attention should be paid to the 
time connection between armed attack and self-defence action. According to the Court, 
the criterion of necessity is not fulfilled if the retaliatory actions are carried out only 
several months after the alleged armed attack has occurred.36  
Further on, in the case of collective self-defence, the victim state has to declare that it 
has been attacked and make a request for help to the helping state.37 The ICJ explained 
this with the reason that  
There is no rule in customary international law permitting another State to 
exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of 
the situation. Where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be expected that 
the State for whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be the 
victim of an armed attack.38 
In addition to that, collective self-defence requires the will and the awareness of the 
helping state to act in self-defence.39 An indication for that can be the fact whether or 
not the helping state has informed the SC.40 
The ICJ upheld its jurisprudence in the Oil Platforms case.41 However, the Court did not 
give a definition of an armed attack but simply refers to its ruling in Nicaragua, stating 
that ‘it is necessary to distinguish "the most grave forms of the use of force (those 
constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms"’.42 
It also left the question open, if one armed attack can consist of a combination of 
several attacks.43 
                                                          
34 Ibid. at para. 176. 
35 Caroline supra note 23, p. 1137-8. 
36 Ibid. at para. 237. 
37 Ibid. at para. 199. 
38 Ibid. at para. 195. 
39 Ibid. at para. 200. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment on the 
Merits, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161 at para. 51 [Oil Platforms]. 
42 Ibid. at para. 51. 
43 Ibid. at para. 64.  
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The ICJ did specify the criteria of necessity and proportionality. It stated that ‘[o]ne 
aspect of these criteria is the nature of the target of the force used avowedly in self-
defence.’44 The self-defence action has to be aimed at a legitimate military target.45 
Regarding the necessity an objective standard has to be applied.46 In order to determine 
the proportionality of the action, the damage caused by the armed attack as well as the 
full extent of the military reaction to the armed attack have to be considered.47  
After having examined these two ICJ cases it may be noted that the lawful exercise of 
self-defence is limited to situations in which the victim state is subject to force of a 
particular scale and effects across international borders (armed attack). Furthermore, 
this kind of large-scale use of force must be exercised by another state or another state 
must be responsible for it. 
Without a doubt the attack in Paris can be seen as large-scale use of force with a major 
effect, therefore constituting an armed attack on France. 130 people were killed, 368 
people were injured. The terrorists used firearms as well as explosive belts and acted in 
a coordinated manner. 
III. Statehood of the IS  
However, the problem remains, that according to the still prevailing view, another state 
must be responsible for the armed attack.48 In the present case, the IS claimed 
responsibility.  
On 29 June 2014 the IS proclaimed itself a caliphate and its leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi (Caliph Ibrahim) the chief political and religious authority over the ummah (the 
global community of Muslims).49 But this alone does not make the IS a state under 
international law. 
                                                          
44 Ibid. at paras. 74, 76. 
45 Ibid. at para. 76. 
46 Ibid. at para. 73. 
47 Ibid. at para. 77. 
48 Nicaragua supra note 28 at para. 195; Oil Platforms supra note 41 at para. 51; Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 
136 at  para. 139 [Palestinian Wall]; Randelzhofer in UN-Commentary supra note 17, Art. 51, para. 34; 
Bothe in Vitzthum, supra note 21, para. 19. 
49 Matthew Weaver, The Guardian, ‘Isis declares caliphate in Iraq and Syria’, 30.06.2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2014/jun/30/isis-declares-caliphate-in-iraq-and-syria-
live-updates (accessed on: 08.08.2016 ). 
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Under international law statehood is defined by the Montevideo Convention. Art. 1 of the 
Convention sets forward the criteria that an entity must fulfil in order to be classified as a 
state. 
According to Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention, the state as a person of international 
law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population, a defined 
territory, an effective government and the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.50 
It has to be noted though, that the elements of statehood are not autonomous and rigid 
criteria.51 They are interdependent and linked to each other.52 
In the following I will show that the IS only fulfils one of the four mentioned criteria, 
namely that of an effective government. The other three criteria, a permanent 
population, a defined territory and the capacity to enter into relations with other states, 
are not met.  
1. Permanent population 
The IS does not have a permanent population. A minimum number of inhabitants is not 
prescribed but it is required that the population is permanent within the meaning of a 
stable community.53 The criterion does not relate to the nationality of that population.54 
The grant of nationality is a matter that states can only govern by their domestic law.55 
Hence, nationality depends upon statehood and not the other way around.56 Therefore, 
the fact that there is no IS-nationality and the inhabitants within the IS territory have 
different nationalities, namely Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan, does not affect this criterion.  
Open to question, is the fact that one could call the inhabitants ‘quasi-hostages’ since 
they live at least partly involuntarily under the IS regime and are subject to massive 
                                                          
50 See: Art. 1 Montevideo Convention.  
51 Crawford, ‘The Creation of States’ (Oxford, 1979), p. 46 [Crawford]; Brownlie, supra note 14, p. 70. 
52 Brownlie, supra note 14, p. 70; Crawford supra note 51, p. 46. 
53 Crawford supra note 51, p. 40; Brownlie, supra note 14, p. 70. 
54 Crawford supra note 51, p. 40; Craven in Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford 2010), p. 216 [author in 
Evans]. 
55 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment of April 6th, 1955, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4 at p. 23. 
56 Crawford supra note 51, p. 40. 
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human rights violations. The spread of IS has led to a massive refugee crisis.57 Those 
inhabitants who can leave. This is also linked to the next point which is even more 
problematic.  
The population within the IS territory waxes and wanes depending on the gain and loss 
of territory and how many inhabitants are able to flee. This creates the non-permanent 
character of the IS-population.  
As the population under IS control does not represent a stable community, the 
permanency of population as required by Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention has to be 
negated.  
2. Defined territory 
The second criterion which is not fulfilled, is that of a defined territory. States are 
territorial entities, that must be in control of a certain area (so called territorial 
sovereignty).58 In international law territory is defined not by using private law analogies 
of real property but by governmental power that is exercised with respect to area and 
population.59 There is no rule prescribing the minimum size of the territory.60 The 
territory over which a state has territorial sovereignty is determined by the area which 
the state effectively controls.61 The IS effectively controls territory in Syria, Iraq and 
Libya. That the IS territory does not have fully defined frontiers is not a reason to 
consider this criterion as not fulfilled. A German-Polish Arbitral Tribunal ruled in 1929:  
Whatever may be the importance of the delimitation of boundaries, one cannot 
go so far as to maintain that as long as this delimitation has not been legally 
effected the State in question cannot be considered as having any territory 
whatever .[…] In order to say that a State exists [...] it is enough that this territory 
has a sufficient consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been 
accurately delimited, and that the State actually exercises independent public 
authority over that territory.62  
                                                          
57 Orlando Crowcroft, International Business Times, ‘Isis: Worst refugee crisis in a generation as millions 
flee Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’, 17.06.2015, available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-worst-refugee-
crisis-generation-millions-flee-islamic-state-iraq-syria-1506613 (accessed on: 08.08.2016). 
58 Brownlie supra note 14, p. 71; Hailbronner/Kau in Vitzthum supra note 21, para. 129. 
59 Crawford supra note 51, p. 42 
60 Ibid. p. 36.; Craven in Evans supra note 54, p. 223. 
61 Hailbronner/Kau in Vitzthum supra note 21, para. 129. 
62 Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State (1929) 5 A.D. No. 5, 14-15 [Deutsche 
Continental]. 
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The ICJ confirmed this rule in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case:  
The appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs 
the precise delimitation of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as to 
boundaries can affect territorial rights. There is for instance no rule that the land 
frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often in various 
places and for long periods they are not, as is shown by the case of Albania into 
the League of Nations.63  
Therefore, the undelimitated boundaries of the IS territory are not a problem. What is a 
problem, however, is the constant gain and loss of territory by the IS. Although the 
boundaries do not have to be defined, there has to be a sufficient consistency of 
controlled territory.64 Over the past two years the IS has gained65 and lost66 territory 
again and again. So there is no consistency. At best, Raqqa/Syria could be described 
as a kind of core territory whereas the IS has recently lost its other stronghold 
Fallujah/Iraq after two years of occupation.67 
Besides that Syria, Iraq and Libya are still sovereigns of the territory occupied by the IS 
despite the fact that they have lost effective control over that territory because they have 
never given up their territory.68 Consequently, whenever the IS loses territory, the 
original state reinstitutes its sovereignty as acquisition of territory by occupation is only 
possible if the territory concerned is not under another state’s territorial sovereignty (so 
called terra nullius) .69 
Thus, it cannot be argued that the IS possesses a defined consistent territory. The 
second criterion of statehood is not met as well. 
 
                                                          
63 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 44 at 
para. 46 [North Sea Continental Shelf Case]. 
64 Deutsche Continental supra note 62, p.15; Crawford supra note 51, p. 40.  
65 Tim Mak, The Daily Beast, ‘ISIS gaining ground in Syria, despite U.S. strikes’, 15.01.2015, available at: 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/14/exclusive-isis-gaining-ground-in-syria-despite-u-s-
strikes.html. (accessed on: 09.08.2016). 
66 Marina Koren, The Atlantic, ‘The latest military offensives against ISIS’, 29.05.2016, available at: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/isis-iraq-fallujah/484802/. (accessed on: 
09.08.2016). 
67 Zia Weise, The Telegraph, ‘Iraqi army declares final “liberation” of Fallujah from Isil’, 26.06.2016, 
available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/26/iraqi-army-declares-fallujah-fully-liberated-from-
islamic-state/. (accessed on: 09.08.2016). 
68 Hailbronner/Kau in Vitzthum supra note 21, para. 136; Bennett/Strug supra note 20, p. 83. 
69 Bennett/Strug supra note 20, p. 82; Hailbronner/Kau in Vitzthum supra note 21, para. 136. 
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3. Effective government 
The third criterion and the only one that the IS fulfils, requires that an entity has to 
provide an effective government. Crawford considers this criterion as the central and 
most important criterion as all the others depend upon it.70 The form of government 
does not play a role in this regard; a dictatorship gets treated the same way as a 
democracy.71 Therefore, the fact that the IS leader was not elected and that the IS is 
constantly violating human rights is, in this regard, not an issue.  
So the IS might lack democracy but it does not lack structure. Although the exact 
structure of the IS may never be revealed we do have accurate information regarding 
the sophisticated bureaucracy that characterises the IS. 
At the top, there is the Emirate (al-Imara) which makes the key decisions.72 The Emirate 
consists of Caliph Ibrahim who functions as the commander in chief, ensuring executive 
as well as judicial functions, and his two top deputies Abu Ali al-Anbari, responsible for 
Syria, and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, responsible for Iraq.73 Both were former generals 
under Sadam Hussein.74 To each top deputy, governors are subordinated.75 We know 
of five governors in Syria and seven governors in Iraq.76 These governors report to the 
top deputies. The Emirate is further supported and advised by nine councils.77 These 
councils are similar to departments or ministries and report to the top deputies as well.78 
They create and carry out the IS policy.79  
                                                          
70 Crawford supra note 51, p. 42. 
71 Craven in Evans supra note 54, p. 237. 
72 See here and in the following: Nick Thompson & Atika Shubert, CNN, ‘The anatomy of ISIS: How the 
“Islamic State” is run, from oil to beheadings’, 14.01.2015, available at: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/ (accessed on: 09.08.2016); Jack 
Moore, Newsweek, ‘ISIS releases new video outlining “structure of the Caliphate”’, 07.07.2016, available 
at: http://europe.newsweek.com/isis-releases-new-video-outlining-structure-caliphate-478502?rm=eu 
(accessed on: 09.08.2016).  
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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First there is the Leadership Council. It makes law and handles important decisions.80 
Its decisions must be approved by Caliph Ibrahim.81 In theory, the Leadership Council 
has the right to depose the caliph.82  
The Shura Council advises the Leadership Council.83 It consists of nine members who 
function as the highest judges.84 They handle law and military matters.85 
The Legal Council deals with family disputes, religious infractions, recruitment of new 
fighters and punishment.86  
The Military Council is responsible for the military or fighting strategy of the IS as well as 
for the defence of the occupied territory.87  
The Security Council is responsible for the internal policy of the IS and carries out 
executions which the Legal Council has determined as punishment.88 
The Intelligence Council provides information to the Leadership Council about enemies 
of the IS.89 
The Financial Council functions as a treasury and supervises the tax system that the IS 
has established.90 It furthers deals with the illegal oil and weapon sales and the ransom 
money that the IS has extorted by its abductions.91  
The Fighters Assistance Council is responsible for providing help and housing for 
fighters who come from foreign countries.92  
                                                          
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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And finally, the Media Council that controls the performance of the IS in the media, 
especially in the social media.93 It is responsible for official pronouncements and 
declarations and works closely together with the Legal Council.94  
It is further reported that the IS maintains a social welfare system which includes the 
provision of education and healthcare and also carries out municipal services like 
sewage and trash collection.95  
The IS maintains its internal order, even if it does so with brutal means and draconian 
punishments. It extracts wealth (in the form of taxes) and labour (mainly military 
services) from its inhabitants and provides social services and it ensures domestic 
security for a part of its inhabitants, namely for those who follow its rules and live 
according to its ideology. It controls effectively the territory it has occupied as well as the 
population that lives on this territory and it has built up a bureaucratic hierarchy in order 
to remain in effective control.  
Therefore, at least for now, the IS has an effective government that is able to fulfil the 
key functions of a state.  
4. Capacity to enter into relations with the other states 
The last criterion that the Montevideo Convention lists is the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states. Crawford has criticised this criterion as being a consequence 
of statehood rather than a requirement thereof.96 For Brownlie, this requirement 
represents the concept of independence.97  
The IS has no embassies in other states and is not party to any multilateral treaty. It is 
communicating with the international community though, via international and social 
media.  
So, the question is, what is actually required by the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states? The actual engagement with other states or the mere capacity to do so? If 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95  Megan Stewart, Political Violence @ a Glance, ‘Why the Islamic State is so Bad at Being a State’. 
22.12.2015, available at: https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/12/22/why-the-islamic-state-is-so-
bad-at-being-a-state/ (accessed on: 09.08.2016). 
96 Crawford supra note 51, p. 47; See likewise: Craven in Evans supra note 54, p. 220. 
97 Brownlie supra note 14, p. 71. 
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the latter is sufficient, than one could argue that the IS does fulfil the last criterion of 
statehood. But bearing in mind the object and purpose of this criterion, that is 
maintaining external (friendly) relations with other states, it cannot be enough to 
communicate with the rest of the world via video clips and internet blogs. The IS wants 
to establish its independence and sovereignty by proclaiming itself a caliphate, in other 
words, it wants independence and sovereignty by its claim for statehood but it must be 
the other way around. A state must claim statehood because it is independent and 
sovereign. Lacking the capacity to enter into relations with other states is keeping a 
state from being independent.98 
Apart from that, the IS is not recognised by any other state. Entering into real relations 
that go beyond media communication with other states is therefore impossible as no 
other state would engage with the IS, at least not officially.  
But this is only the factual effect that the non-recognition of the IS has. What are the 
legal implications of the non-recognition?  
Recognition is a further criterion, which is not mentioned in the Montevideo Convention.  
There has been much debate about the legal effect of recognition.  
The constitutive theory asserts that the legal effect of recognition is constitutive which 
means that without recognition there is no statehood.99  
The declaratory theory on the other hand, claims that the legal effect is purely 
declaratory, that is the pure acknowledgement of an existing fact.100 Recognition is a 
merely political act and therefore not necessary for statehood. 101 
Following the constitutive theory, the non-recognition of the IS has the legal effect that 
the IS is not a state under international law and will not be a state unless it is recognised 
by the international community. 
Following the declaratory theory, the non-recognition of the IS has no legal effect on its 
statehood. The IS can still be a state under international law, provided that it fulfils the 
criteria of statehood, even if it is not recognised by the international community.  
                                                          
98 Ibid. 
99 Bennet/Strug supra note 20, p. 73; Hailbronner/Kau in Vitzthum supra note 21, para. 175. 
100 Hailbronner/Kau in Vitzthum supra note 21, para. 175; Bennet/Strug supra note 20, p. 74. 
101 Shaw supra note 25, p. 446; Bennet/Strug supra note 20, p. 74.  
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It is very unlikely that the international community will recognised the IS in the future. It 
will not get recognised and not because of legal reasons.  
The recent practice of recognition indicates that entities that do not have democratic 
structures and that do not ensure protection for human rights have problems to get 
recognised as states.  
For instance, after the dissolution of the SFRY in 1991, Macedonia and Croatia sought 
(independent) statehood. The Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on 
Yugoslavia102 provided legal advice on the issue. In its Opinions No. 5 (regarding 
Croatia) 103 and No. 6 (regarding Macedonia)104 it stated that recognition will only be 
given to those states if they, among other things, adopt a constitution embodying 
democratic structures and the guarantees for human rights.  
The EU had elaborated the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union’105 according to which the recognition of new states 
requires that these new states, inter alia, respect for the provisions of the UNC and “the 
Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights.”106 Additionally, the Guidelines provided that ‘[t]he Community and its Member 
States will not recognize entities which are the result of aggression’107 
So this indicates that there are not only legal requirements that an entity has to fulfil in 
order to get recognised as a state but that the entity must also have some form of 
legitimacy.  
The IS does not have democratic structures, it does not protect human rights, it does 
not respect the provision of the UNC or the rule of law and its territory is the result of 
aggression against Libya, Syria and Iraq. It lacks every form of legitimacy. Therefore, it 
is safe to say that the international community will never recognise the IS. Recognition 
thus has a constitutive effect. 
                                                          
102 Commonly known as the Badinter Commission. 
103 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions arising from the Dissolution 
of Yugoslavia (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1488 at 1504-1505. 
104 Ibid., p. 1510. 
105 The European Community Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1485. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
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The IS also does not fulfil the fourth and last criterion of the Montevideo Convention, as 
it is lacking the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
IV. Interim Conclusion 
According to the explanations above the IS is not a state as it does not fulfil three of the 
four criteria listed in the Montevideo Convention. It should be mentioned though that 
one could argue differently, for example, stating that the IS has a permanent population 
at least on a de facto-basis or that the city of Raqqa and its suburbs are the core 
territory of the IS, especially because a minimum size of territory is not required. There 
is not much in the Montevideo Convention that would evidently deny statehood to the IS 
as legitimacy is no element of the Convention. 
But in the international community the IS is not regarded as a state and it will and 
should never be. The IS has beheaded and burned alive people in front of the recording 
camera, it has plundered towns and villages, it has robbed territory of Syria, Iraq and 
Libya and it has threatened to kill anyone who disagrees with its fundamentalist view of 
Islam. And that is exactly why there is no way it will ever be accepted as a sovereign 
and equal state and therefore recognised by the international community. Not because 
of legal reasons but because it lacks legitimacy and because violence and terror should 
not be honoured. 
Therefore, the IS is not a suitable attacker in the meaning of Art. 51 of the UNC 
although being responsible for the attack in Paris. 
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C) Chapter 3: The traditional approach: Attribution to Syria 
This chapter introduces the traditional view according to which attribution to a state is 
required if the armed attack was carried out by a non-state actor. Therefore, I will 
examine if the attack in Paris is attributable to Syria. As a basis for attribution I will firstly 
discuss the ILC-Draft Articles, secondly the Safe Haven-Doctrine and finally the 
Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine. 
I. Attribution according to the ILC-Draft Articles 
The ASR constitute a legal basis for determining the responsibility of states. In their 
current version, the ASR were prepared by the ILC in 2001.108 They are not formally 
binding but reflect to a large extent, that means at least the basic rules in chapter II, 
customary international law.109  
1.  Art. 5 of the ASR 
An attribution according to Art. 5 of the ASR requires that the conduct of the IS must be 
empowered by the law of Syria in order to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority.  
As the IS has no authority under Syrian law, the requirement of Art. 5 of the ASR is not 
met. 
2. Art. 4 of the ASR 
Under Art. 4 of the ASR 
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or 
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, 
and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a 
territorial unit of the State.  
Since the IS is definitely not a state organ of Syria its conduct cannot be attributed to 
Syria under Art. 4 of the ASR. 
 
                                                          
108 See UN GA res 56/83 of 12 December 2001, annex. 
109 ‘Commentaries to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, Report of 
the ILC on the Work of its fifty-third session, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), Art. 4, para. 6 [ASR with 
Commentaries]. 
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3. Art. 11 of the ASR 
Attribution according to Art. 11 of the ASR requires that the ‘[c]onduct which is not 
attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an 
act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges 
and adopts the conduct in question as its own.’ 
Art. 11 of the ASR allows for attribution of private conduct which was not or may not 
have been attributable at the time it was carried out, but which is subsequently 
acknowledged and adopted by the state as its own.110 
Syria has neither acknowledged nor adopted the conduct of the IS, namely the attack in 
Paris, as its own. Syria’s President Assad said that the attack in Paris was a result of 
the French aid for rebel groups in his country and the consequence of a wrong Western 
Syria policy.111 He further stated that Syria as well as France suffered from the terrorism 
of the IS.112 
Hence, the requirements of Art. 11 of the ASR are not met. 
4. Art. 10 of the ASR 
Art. 10 para. 1 and 2 of the ASR provide:  
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new 
government of a State shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law. 2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in 
establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a 
territory under its administration shall be considered an act of the new State 
under international law. 
Para. 1 of Art. 10 of the ASR deals with the scenario in which an insurrectional 
movement becomes the new government of a state.113 The IS has not become the new 
government of Syria, so that Art. 10 para. 1 of the ASR does not apply here.  
                                                          
110 Ibid.,, Art. 11, para. 1. 
111 Hugh Naylor, The Washington Post, ‘Syria’s President Assad says Paris attacks result from France’s 
aiding of rebels’, 14.11.2015, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/assad-says-paris-
attacks-result-from-frances-aiding-rebels-in-syria/2015/11/14/287f7576-8adc-11e5-bd91-
d385b244482f_story.html?utm_term=.bb9a3af340d3 (accessed on: 29.11.2016).  
112 Ibid. 
113 ASR with Commentaries supra note 109, Art. 10, para. 7. 
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Para. 2 of the ASR covers the scenario in which the insurrectional movement 
establishes a new state in the territory of an already existing state or in a territory under 
its administration. As I have shown in chapter two, the IS does not fulfil the criteria of 
statehood. Hence it has not established a state in the territory of Syria.  
Therefore, the attack in Paris cannot be attributed to Syria according to Art. 10 of the 
ASR. 
5. Art. 9 of the ASR 
According to Art. 9 of the ASR: 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a 
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact 
exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of 
the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of 
those elements of authority.   
Art. 9 of the ASR covers the exceptional case of conduct when a person or a group of 
persons exercise elements of the governmental authority acting in the absence of the 
official authorities and without any actual authority to do so.114 The exceptional 
character of the circumstances considered in the article is illustrated by the phrase ‘in 
circumstances such as to call for’.115 The underlying principle of Art. 9 of the ASR is the 
old idea that the citizens of a state, that are private persons, have a right to self-defence 
in the absence of the regular forces, it is a form of agency of necessity.116  
Art. 9 of the ASR sets up three conditions that must be fulfilled so that the conduct can 
be attributed to the state117: firstly, the conduct must show the exercise of elements of 
the governmental authority.118 Secondly, the conduct must have been carried out in the 
absence or default of the official authorities.119 Thirdly, due to the circumstances the 
exercise of those elements of authority must have been necessary.120 
                                                          
114 ASR with Commentaries supra note 109, Art. 9, para. 1.  
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., para. 2. 
117 Ibid., para. 3. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
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The IS is effectively controlling parts of the Syrian territory and exercises on that 
territory elements of governmental authority.121 It does so in the absence of the Assad-
regime, which is still the rightful and representative government of Syria. At first sight, 
an attribution to Syria seems therefore possible. However, in the context of the civil war 
in Syria the IS is fighting the Assad-regime and is hence one reason why the regime 
has lost control over parts of its territory. The IS is more acting as a de facto 
government in the parts that it is controlling than as private persons carrying out 
governmental authority. Art. 9 of the ASR, however, does not apply in such a case as a 
de facto government is only the replacement of the previous government.122 
Thus, the attack in Paris cannot be attributed to Syria under Art. 9 of the ASR. 
6. Art. 8 of the ASR 
However, in the case of private non-state actors carrying out attacks from the territory of 
the host state, the attacks could be attributed according to Art. 8 of the ASR. 
Art. 8 of the ASR states that ‘The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is 
in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct.’ Thus, the conduct of a private person is attributable to a state 
if there is a connection between the state and the person concerned.123 Art. 8 of the 
ASR covers two such circumstances.124 The first involves private persons acting on the 
instructions of the state.125 The second deals with a more general situation where 
private persons act under the state’s direction or control.126 It is not clear though, 
whether ‘control’ in Art. 8 of the ASR means ‘effective’ or ‘overall’ control. The 
commentaries of the articles are not very helpful in this regard as they refer to the 
‘effective control-test’127 as well as to the ‘overall control-test’128 without deciding in 
favour of one or the other. 
                                                          
121 See for that: section B.III.3. 
122 Ibid., para. 4. 
123 ASR with Commentaries supra note 109, Art. 8, para. 1. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., Art. 8, para 4. 
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a. The ‘effective control-test’ 
In 1986 the ICJ established the ‘effective control-test’ in Nicaragua129. It held that: 
Participation [...] in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of 
the contras [...] is still insufficient in itself [...] for the purpose of attributing to the 
United States the acts committed by the contras [....]. For this conduct to give rise 
to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved 
that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the 
course of which the alleged violations were committed.130 
Attribution according to the ‘effective control-test’ requires factual control.131 The 
essence of such a control is the actual exercise of control as well as the factual power 
to give commands and to demand obedience.132   
b. The ‘overall control-test’ 
The standard in Nicaragua was somewhat softened by the so called ‘overall control-test’ 
that the ICTY applied in Tadić.133 According to the Court:  
The requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts 
performed by private individuals is that the State exercises control over the 
individuals. The degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual 
circumstances of each case [....] [In the given case it is therefore sufficient to 
establish] overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such 
forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of military 
operations.134   
In contrast to the ‘effective control-test’, this test does not necessarily require exclusive 
operational command, but the exercise of overall control over the non-state actor.135  
c. Interim Conclusion 
The ‘effective control-test’ constitutes a high threshold for attribution. Although the 
‘overall control-test’ does lower this standard, it should be noted that both approaches 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
128 Ibid. para. 5. 
129 Nicaragua supra note 28 at para. 65. 
130 Ibid. at para. 115. 
131 Cassese supra note 13, p. 190. 
132 Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in the Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in 
Bosnia’ (2007) 18 EJIL 649 at 653 [Cassese Nicaragua]; Milanovic/Papic, ‘As Bad As It Gets: The 
European Court of Human Rights’ Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’ (2009) 
58 ICLQ 267 at 288-289. 
133 Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (Case no. IT-94-1-A), para. 120. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
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require that the host state must direct or control the activity of the non-state actor on its 
territory.136 Simply encouraging or tolerating in the sense of harbouring terrorists is not 
enough for attribution.137   
It should be further noted that the ‘effective control-test’ as well as the ‘overall control-
test’ have been subject to criticism repeatedly.138   
The ‘effective control-test’ was criticised mainly for putting an unrealistic burden of proof 
on the injured state and not reflecting accurately the current state of international law.139 
Indeed, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide evidence of specific instructions or 
directions that the state in question has given to the non-state actor. Some 
commentators are of the opinion that ‘the traditional “effective control-test” […] seems 
insufficient to address the threats posed by global criminals and the states that harbor 
them’.140 
The ‘overall control-test’ on the other hand was criticised for being too lax.141 The ICJ 
rejected the test with the argument that it is unpersuasive and not suitable for 
determining state responsibility.142 The ICTY had only criminal jurisdiction that is 
jurisdiction over natural persons but not over states.143 The Court held that: ‘In this 
regard the “overall control” test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking 
point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its 
international responsibility.’144 
                                                          
136 Reinold, ‘State weakness, irregular warfare, and the right to self-defence post-9/11’ (2011) 105 AJIL 
244 at 251 [Reinold]. 
137 Ibid. 
138 E.g.: Cassese Nicaragua supra note 132, p.653. 
139 Stahn, ‘Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-defense, Article 51 (1/2) of the UN Charter, 
and International Terrorism’ (2003) 27 FFWAJ 35 at 47 [Stahn].   
140 Burke-White & Slaughter, ‘An International Constitutional Moment’ (2002) 43 HILJ 1 at 20. 
141 Quoted after: Tyner, ‘Internationalization of War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Folly in Tadic’ (2006) 18 Fla. J. Int’l L. 843 at 868.  
142 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p.43 at para. 404 [Genocide 
Case]. 
143 Ibid., at para. 403.  
144 Ibid., at para. 406. 
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However, no matter which control test one applies, the attack in Paris cannot be 
attributed to Syria. Syria has neither directed nor controlled the IS in any way. It had 
neither effective nor overall control over the IS. 
Altogether, the attack in Paris cannot be attributed to Syria according to the ASR. 
II. Attribution according to the Safe Haven-Doctrine 
But, the attack could be attributed to Syria under the Safe Haven-Doctrine.145 
Under this doctrine, a state has the right to secure itself with military means against 
other states that harbour or support terrorist groups in any way.146 An attribution 
requires therefore at least some form of collaboration between the harbouring state and 
the terrorist organisation and that the harbouring state deliberately provides a safe 
haven for the organisation. 
The Safe Haven-Doctrine emerged shortly after the attacks of 9/11 and was used to 
justify operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in which an international US-led coalition invaded 
Afghanistan as it was assumed that Al-Qaeda was supported by the Taliban and 
Afghanistan was considered to be a safe haven for Al-Qaeda.147  
This exactly is the crucial difference between the attack in Paris and the attacks of 9/11. 
In contrast to the conflict situation in Afghanistan with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 
2001, the IS being a civil war party in Syria is combated by the Assad-regime. 148  It is in 
no way tolerated or encouraged, let alone actively supported by it. 
Under the Safe Haven-Doctrine the attack in Paris cannot be attributed to Syria. The 
question if and how legally convincing this doctrine is will thus not be further examined 
here.  
 
                                                          
145 This doctrine is also referred to as ‘Bush-Doctrine’. 
146 Von Arnauld, ‘Völkerrecht’ (Heidelberg 2012), para. 1088 [von Arnauld]. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See e.g.: Reuters, Newsweek, 29.03.2016, ‘Inside Putin’s and Assad’s War against ISIS’, available at: 
http://europe.newsweek.com/putin-isis-assad-syria-palmyra-russia-war-islamic-state-441497?rm=eu 
(accessed on: 08.09.2016). On the other hand there are also voices claiming that Assad is working 
together with the IS, e.g.: Zvi Bar'el, Haaretz, ‘Assad's Cooperation With ISIS Could Push U.S. Into Syria 
Conflict’, 03.01.2015, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.659340 (accessed on: 
08.09.2016). 
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III. Attribution according to the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine 
However, the Paris attack could be attributed to Syria according to the Unwilling or 
Unable-Doctrine.  
On the 23rd of September 2014 Samantha Powers, the US Ambassador at the UN sent 
a letter to the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon, in which she justified the US 
military strikes against the IS in Syria as the exercise of Iraq’s right to self-defence. She 
wrote that: 
States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
when, as is the case here, the government of the State where the threat is located is 
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.149  
Furthermore, the letter stated: ‘The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not 
confront these safe-havens effectively itself.’150 
1. The content of the doctrine 
Pursuant to the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine, a state that has become the victim of an 
armed attack by a non-state actor that operates from the territory of another state, can 
only exercise its right to self-defence if it had ensured that the host state is unwilling or 
unable to supress the threat posed by the non-state actor.151 If the host state is willing 
and/or able, the attacked state is not allowed to use defensive force, whereas it is 
expected from the host state to take appropriate measures against the non-state 
actor.152 The Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine is based on two concepts. Firstly, it is based 
on the understanding that sovereignty entails responsibility, including duties towards 
third states and secondly, on the relative character of territorial integrity.153 
The term of ‘unwilling or unable’ has recently undergone a revival in international law. 
This revival was triggered by the increasing threat that terrorist attacks posing on 
international peace and security. For instance, as seen above, the US justified its initial 
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air strikes against the IS in Syria with the exercise of collective self-defence to the 
benefit of Iraq as Syria cannot and will not take actions against the IS strongholds on its 
territory.  
However, the term is by no means new.154 It has been a paradigm of US foreign policy 
for quite a while.155 Beyond the context of self-defence it has been used as a 
justification for multilateral interventions without authorisation by the SC within states 
that do not prevent massive human rights violations within their territory.156 In contrast to 
the repeated application of this doctrine in practice stands its rare usage in written legal 
authorities. The only international treaty that has incorporated the term ‘unwilling or 
unable’ regarding states is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.157  
Even though the doctrine has frequently been used in international practice, there is no 
established definition with clear criteria. Under current international law every state can 
or must determine for itself what ‘unwilling’ and what ‘unable’ exactly means.  
As I have shown above the Assad-regime is willing to fight the IS. That the regime alone 
was unable to do so was more or less obvious since the IS could stretch out easily on 
Syrian territory. Only the military strikes by France and the USA as well as the military 
support of the Assad-regime by Russia and Iran are now keeping the terrorist 
organisation from conquering more and more territory.  
As there is no definition of the criterion of inability, it is difficult to say if Syria can still be 
considered unable to fight the IS as the Assad-regime by now has strong (military) 
support from Russia and Iran.  
2. A rule of customary international law? 
Apart from that, it is highly questionable if the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine is already a 
rule of customary international law. The ICJ has laid down the criteria for identifying a 
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rule of customary international law in North Sea Continental Shelf.158 Accordingly, the 
existence of a rule of customary international law requires an established state practice 
together with opinio iuris.159 Established state practice means that there must be a 
uniform, general and consistent practice.160 The ICJ held:  
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of Iaw requiring it. 
[…] The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the 
acts is not in itself enough.161 
The following section examines the recent state practice regarding the attribution of 
terrorist acts in order to find out which status the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine has. 
After becoming independent in 1991, Georgia continued to experience a series of 
internal struggles.162 The region of Pankisi Gorge became infamous in the late 1990s as 
Chechen rebels, criminals and transnational terrorists started to hide there.163 Allegedly, 
also members of Al-Qaeda were hiding in the Gorge after 9/11.164 Following 9/11, 
Russia started to drop bombs on Chechen rebels that were hiding in the Gorge and that 
would attack Russian troops and then move back to the Gorge.165 Russia accused 
Georgia of harbouring Chechen rebels in the region and demanded that Georgia 
permits Russian troops to drive these terrorists out of the Gorge.166 After the rebels had 
attacked Russian troops multiple times, Russia carried out several raids on Georgian 
territory, claiming it was exercising its right to self-defence as Georgia was ‘unable or 
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unwilling to counteract the terrorist threat’.167 In the beginning Russia denied the 
intervention but then sent a letter to the UN Secretary General in which it stated:  
The continued existence in separate parts of the world of territorial enclaves 
outside the control of national governments, which, owing to the most diverse 
circumstances, are unable or unwilling to counteract the terrorist threat is one of 
the reasons that complicate efforts to combat terrorism effectively. One such 
place, where the situation is giving rise to particular alarm in the Russian 
Federation, is the Pankisi Gorge.168 
Russia also claimed that Georgia was failing to comply with its sovereign responsibilities 
under international law, especially, with those constituted by SC resolution 1373 and 
argued that this failure to comply legitimated its defensive use of force:  
Beginning in 1999, when we proposed to the Georgian leaders that we should 
carry out joint actions to prevent fighters from Chechnya from penetrating 
Georgia, up to the events in recent times, the Russian Federation has patiently 
and persistently attempted to arrange cooperation with the official authorities in 
Tbilisi on issues related to combating terrorism. […] If the Georgian leadership is 
unable to establish a security zone in the area of the Georgian-Russian border, 
continues to ignore United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 
September 2001, and does not put an end to the bandit sorties and attacks on 
adjoining areas in the Russian Federation, we reserve the right to act in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which lays down 
every Member State's inalienable right of individual or collective self-defence.169 
Russia contended further that because of Georgia’s non-compliance with its obligation 
to control its territory effectively, the problem was caused in the first place: 
None of this will be necessary, no measures or special operations will be needed 
if the Georgian leadership actually controls its own territory, carries out 
international obligations in combating international terrorism and prevents 
possible attacks by international terrorists from its territory against the territory of 
the Russian Federation.170 
The government of Georgia, on the other hand contended that it was able to effectively 
control its territory, not least because of military training that Georgian troops had 
received from the US.171   
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No state commented on the question if the Chechen activities on Georgian territory 
constituted an armed attack on Russia.172 Only the USA173 and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe protested against Russia’s military action reaffirming 
Georgia’s right to territorial integrity.174 
Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist political, military and social organisation that has 
significant influence in Lebanon.175 During the Israeli occupation in the early 1980s 
Hezbollah emerged with the help of Iran.176 Step-by-step the organisation became a key 
player in Lebanon's political system, and has effectively gained veto power in the 
cabinet.177 Hezbollah has been accused of launching attacks against Jewish and Israeli 
targets and is labelled a terrorist organisation by western states, Israel, Gulf Arab 
countries and the Arab League.178 
In 2006 Israel intervened in Lebanon invoking Art. 51 of the UNC after it had suffered 
various attacks carried out by the Hezbollah.179 Israel accused Lebanon of failing to 
meet its counterterrorism obligations under international law and attributed responsibility 
for Hezbollah’s aggression to the government of Lebanon as Hezbollah was a part of 
the Lebanese government as well as to the governments of Iran and Syria.180 While Iran 
and Syria have actively supported Hezbollah materially and ideologically, Lebanon’s 
responsibility derives only from its ‘ineptitude and inaction’ in keeping Hezbollah to 
operate from its territory.181 Israel further stated that:  
When sovereign States fail to govern responsibly according to their duties under 
international law, terrorists and other non-State actors seek to take advantage of 
the void. Similarly, when States support terrorist groups by providing safe haven, 
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weapons, training and financing, they should bear responsibility for the actions of 
those groups and be held accountable for violations of international law.182 
The Lebanese government rejected responsibility for the Hezbollah activities and 
therefore regarded Israel’s strikes during 2006 as an act of aggression:  
The Israeli Government has held the Lebanese Government responsible for 
certain acts, even though the Lebanese Government […] declared that it was not 
aware of the incident that occurred on the Blue Line on that date, that it did not 
take responsibility for it and that it did not endorse that act.183 
The first international reactions to Israel’s strike were positive. The Council of the 
European Union for instance, affirmed Israel’s right to self-defence.184 But the approval 
disappeared when hostilities and casualties increased.185 It was widely accepted that 
Hezbollah’s several small-scale attacks cumulatively amounted to an armed attack on 
Israel186 and that Israel in principle had the right to defend itself but that its self-defence 
actions were disproportionate.187  
The PKK, the Kurdish Worker’s Party was formed in the late 1970s.188 It fights for a 
Kurdish state within Turkey and has launched several attacks on Turkish targets since 
1984.189 The PKK claims that the Kurdish people want to live within the borders of 
Turkey on their own land freely, while Turkey contends that they want to create a 
separate state in Turkey.190 The PKK is labelled a terrorist organisation by the EU and 
the US.191 From 1991 on the mostly Kurdish-populated regions in northern Iraq became 
a safe haven for Kurdish PKK fighters who from there frequently launched attacks on 
Turkish territory.192 Over the next two decades Turkey regularly attacked PKK 
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headquarters in the region against the will of Iraq.193 In 2008 Turkey’s military actions 
reached its peak when Turkey expanded its military actions to a full-scale ground 
offensive.194 Turkey did not inform the SC of its operation and did not provide a detailed 
legal basis for its military actions but kept referring to its right to self-defence and stated 
that Iraq was unwilling or unable to supress the threat the PKK fighters were posing.195 
Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said: ‘We have reached the point of 
self-defense, and we are ready to do whatever is necessary in light of common 
sense,’196 General Yasar Buyukanit, chairman of Turkey’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, says 
there is no difference between the terrorist and the one who gives him shelter.197 Iraq 
expressly condemned the invasion but did not bring the matter to the SC.198         
The international community at large remained silent and those that did comment on the 
case referred to the political impact of the military actions rather than to its legal 
foundation.199 The EU, for instance, called on Turkey to pursue diplomatic solutions and 
said it hoped that Turkey would respect the territorial integrity of Iraq.200 China also 
stated that the parties should resolve the issues through dialogue and consultation.201 
Belgium declared that ‘force isn’t the best answer’ but also called on Iraq to put an end 
to further terrorist attacks from its territory.202 Russia demanded for a political settlement 
und requested Turkey to respect Iraq’s territorial sovereignty but also put emphasize on 
the importance of not permitting ‘the territory of some or other states to be used as a 
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bridgehead for terrorist activities against their neighbors.’203 The US position in this 
context is unclear. On the one hand, the US never questioned Turkey’s right to self-
defence and even provided support for the Turkish invasion. On the other hand, it called 
on Turkey to exercise its right in a proportionate way and to strike a balance between its 
security interests and Iraq’s territorial sovereignty.204 
According to experts, Ecuador has become ‘a key meeting ground for multiple 
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations and an important part of a pipeline that 
moves not only cocaine but human cargo, weapons, precursor chemicals and hundreds 
of millions of dollars a year.’205 Ecuador as well as Colombia have problems to control 
the 365-mile border that separates the two countries, mainly because the border region 
is characterised by low population, thick jungle and almost no government presence.206 
The border region thus became a safe haven for the FARC. The FARC are Colombia's 
largest rebel group and were founded in 1964 as the armed wing of the Communist 
Party.207 Their main founders were small farmers and land workers who had affiliated to 
fight against the increasing inequality in Colombia at the time.208 While the FARC have 
some urban groups, they have always been an overwhelmingly rural guerrilla 
organisation.209 While the US, the EU and Colombia regard the FARC a terrorist 
organisation, other countries, especially ones in the region, consider the FARC fighters 
freedom fighters.210 In 2008 Colombia killed two dozen fighters of the FARC, including 
Paul Reyes, a prominent figure of the organisation, on Ecuadorian territory after these 
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fighters had constantly launched attacks on Colombian territory.211 Colombia justified its 
action as ‘legitimate self-defence’212, stating that it had frequently asked Ecuador to take 
action against the FARC.213 Colombia claimed that its military action was the necessary 
consequence to Ecuador’s failure to fulfil its sovereign responsibilities.214 Ecuador 
protested against the military raid and claimed that its territorial sovereignty had been 
violated.215 The two biggest regional organisations, the OAS and the RIO group, 
criticised the raid but did not condemn Colombia officially.216 The RIO group stated that 
it has a ‘grave concern’ regarding the invasion, it denounced the violation of Ecuador’s 
integrity and reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention.217 However, it also affirmed its 
‘firm commitment to counter threats to the security of all states, arising from the action 
of irregular groups or criminal organizations.’218 The OAS said Colombia’s intervention 
was ‘a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador,’ reaffirmed the 
principle of non-intervention and stated that ‘the right of each State to protect itself [...] 
does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another State.’219 This 
announcement contradicts the resolution that the OAS has adopted after the attacks of 
9/11. In the post-9/11 resolution it reaffirmed the right to self-defence, made no 
distinction between the terrorists and the state that harbours them, and declared that 
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‘those that aid, abet or harbor terrorist organizations are responsible for the acts of 
those terrorists.’220 
The international community, including the SC and the GA, remained silent on the 
matter and therefore seemed to accept Colombia’s interpretation of the right to self-
defence.221 Only the USA explicitly confirmed Colombia’s right to self-defence.222                                    
Osama bin Laden was the founder and head of Al-Qaeda, an Islamist terrorist group. 
He and his terrorist organisation are responsible, inter alia for the bombing of the US 
embassies in Kenia and Tanzania in 1998, for the 9/11 attacks223 and the attack on the 
French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in 2015.224 The US have been trying to 
capture bin Laden since 2001 and finally became aware of his whereabouts in 
September 2001.225 In 2011 a team of US Navy Seals killed bin Laden in a military raid 
in the city of Abbottabad, on Pakistani territory without the knowledge, consent or 
cooperation of Pakistan.226 The compound on which bin Laden lived and was killed was 
very close to a Pakistani military camp and therefore raised doubts about Pakistan’s 
engagement in the fight against terrorism.227 The US invoked its right to self-defence. It 
was believed that bin Laden continuously planned further attacks on the US and that the 
killing was necessary as Pakistan was unwilling or unable to supress the threat that he 
and Al-Qaeda posed.228 Pakistan’s behaviour was ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
approved of the killing but also accused the US of violating the prohibition on the use of 
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force.229 Although there were some voices claiming that the killing was illegal,230 the 
lawfulness of the raid was never really questioned. The killing of bin Laden met a huge 
worldwide approval, including such of the UN, the NATO, the Arab League and the 
EU.231 Only the Prime Minister for the Hamas government in Gaza criticised the 
killing.232 
Al-Shabab is an Islamist militant group that is allied to Al-Qaeda and based in 
Somalia.233 Somalia, a former British protectorate, collapsed into anarchy in 1991 after 
President Siad Barre was overthrown and subsequently became a safe haven Al-
Shabab fighters.234 The group is fighting the UN-supported government in Somalia and 
has carried out several attacks in neighbouring Kenya, targeting mainly tourists and 
Westerners.235 Al-Shabab is labelled a terrorist organisation by the US and most 
European countries.236 In 2011 Kenya intervened in Somalia with some 2,000 troops 
after the terrorists had kidnapped several European tourists and aid workers in 
Kenya.237 Kenya stated that it ‘has the right to defend itself’238 and that ‘the government 
is taking robust measures to protect and preserve the integrity of the country by 
invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter’.239 
The intervention has gained very little to no attention by the international community. 
Only Israel explicitly approved of it.240   
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Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia in 1962 but gained independence in 1993.241 From 
1998 to 2000 the two countries fought a border war.242 Since its independence Eritrea’s 
President Isaias Afwerki runs the country with an iron fist and controls almost every 
aspect of Eritrean society.243 He is subject to UN and regional sanctions and is accused 
of backing Al-Shaba in Somalia, of supporting anti-western or insurgent groups in 
Djibouti, Uganda and Sudan and providing safe haven to Ethiopian rebels.244 In 2012 
Ethiopia carried out a dawn raid in Eritrea against ‘subversive groups’ that had carried 
out attacks on its territory.245 Ethiopia did not make any reference to a legal justification 
and simply stated that Eritrea was supporting these groups.246 The raid received only 
very little international attention.247 Britain said it is ‘deeply concerned’ but did not 
condemn the intervention expressly.248 The US called on both countries to ‘exercise 
restraint and to avoid any further military action’.249 
State practice has shown that the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine has been used as a 
basis for attribution. There is a clear trend. Russia expressly invoked it concerning its 
intervention in Georgia in 2002. Turkey did the same in 2008 as well as the US in 2011 
after killing bin Laden. In the other examples (e.g. Colombia and Kenya), the invading 
state did not mention the doctrine expressly but mostly stated that it had to act and 
defend itself because the other state did not take actions against the non-state actor or 
because it did not fulfil its international counter-terrorism obligations. Protests or 
condemnations by the international community regarding the respective interventions 
were rare. In most cases states expressed either a general concern (like Britain 
regarding Ethiopia’s intervention in Eritrea) or a general and blank statement (like the 
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US regarding the same intervention). In none of the above mentioned examples the 
international community as a whole condemned the intervention. If there were official 
condemnations at all, these were made by single states. This shows that there is some 
form of explicit acceptance that the use of force against a non-state actor on the territory 
of another state is permitted.  
However, state practice is not consistent or uniform, as required, and it cannot be 
because the content or the parameters of the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine are not 
clear. In other words, even if states did apply this doctrine, they do not really know how 
to apply it. The unclear parameters of the doctrine simply prevent a uniform, consistent 
and general application.250 Apart from that, in none of the examples the state seemed to 
use the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine because it felt obligated251 by law to do so.252 
opinio iuris, however, is one of the requirements of customary international law.  
Thus, there is no consistent state practice and no opinio iuris. This leads to the result 
that it would be too early to qualify the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine as a rule of 
customary international law.  
Moreover, the attack in Paris to Syria is not attributable according to the Unwilling or 
Unable-Doctrine.  
IV. Interim Conclusion 
The examination has shown that the attack in Paris to Syria is not attributable under the 
ASR, nor under the Safe Haven-Doctrine, nor under the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine. 
Regarding the latter, the main reason is its unclear content, which also hinders it from 
becoming a rule of customary international law. On the other hand, state practice has 
also shown that there is some form of implied acceptance of the use of force against a 
non-state actor on the territory of a third state.  
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D) Chapter 4: A new interpretation of the rules of attribution  
I. Emergence of a new legal framework after 9/11? 
Since the incidents of 9/11 there has been a wide-ranging debate if it is necessary to 
turn away from the traditional interstate perspective and to extend the concept of self-
defence to repel also armed attacks by non-state actors, independently from an 
attribution to a state. This would be inevitable because international law had to find an 
answer to the emerging threats that non-state actors and above all, terrorist 
organisations, pose to international peace and security.253  
Such a new understanding of the right to self-defence is tied to the interpretation of Art. 
51 of the UNC, in which according to Art. 31 para. 3 lit. b) of the VCLT, any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty shall be taken into account. 
1. Effect of the SC Resolutions 1368, 1373 and 1438 
The major argument that supporters of this view have brought forward is the recent 
decision-making practice of the SC.  
After the attacks of 9/11 in 2001 the SC has issued three resolutions in which it found 
that acts of international terrorism are a threat to international peace and security in the 
meaning of Art. 39 of the UNC. These are the resolutions 1368,254 1373,255 and 1438.256  
In the resolutions 1368 and 1373, which were adopted against the backdrop of the 9/11 
attacks, the SC further mentions explicitly the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defence. Supporters of the above mentioned approach argue therefore that the 
resolutions ‘cannot but be read as affirmations of the view that large-scale attacks by 
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non-State actors can qualify as “armed attacks” within the meaning of Article 51’257 or 
that the resolutions constitute a right to self-defence against terrorist organisations.258  
The OAS259 as well as the OSCE260 recognised the right to self-defence within the 
context of the 9/11 attacks, too. 
However, there are three arguments that can be put forward against this view. Firstly, 
the SC’s power to authorise enforcement measures pursuant to chapter VII is triggered 
if the SC finds a threat to international peace and security.261 The right to self-defence, 
on the other hand, requires an armed attack.262 An armed attack in the sense of Art. 51 
of the UNC and a threat to peace and security in the sense of Art. 39 of the UNC are 
qualitatively not the same. The threshold for an armed attack is much higher than the 
threshold for a threat to international peace and security.263 Consequently, if the SC 
finds in resolutions 1368 and 1373 that acts of international terrorism are a threat to 
international peace and security, this only triggers its power to act under chapter VII of 
the UNC. It means that the SC favours an extensive interpretation of ‘a threat to 
international peace and security’. It does not automatically imply that the SC favours an 
extensive interpretation of the notion armed attack as well. Quite the contrary, while an 
extensive interpretation of ‘a threat to international peace and security’ leads to the 
desirable broader application of collective enforcement measures, the extensive 
interpretation of ‘armed attack’ on the other hand, entails an extension of unilateral use 
of force by states. 
Secondly, the wording and the structure of the resolutions speak against interpreting the 
resolutions as an affirmation of a right to self-defence against terrorist organisation or 
non-state actors.  
Resolution 1368 refers to ‘recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence’, resolution 1373 to ‘reaffirming’ this right. Both words implicate a rather general 
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reference of the SC to the right to self-defence which states have in the case of an 
armed attack.264 Concrete measures of self-defence against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or 
Afghanistan are not granted to the USA.265 
Furthermore, the resolutions, like all resolutions of the SC, are divided into an 
acclamatory and an operative part.266 The acclamatory part can be seen as a preamble 
which does not contain binding declarations. In the operative part, on the other hand, 
the SC traditionally makes binding decisions and determinations.267 The reference to 
the right to self-defence in both resolutions is in the acclamatory and not in the operative 
part.268  
Additionally, although resolution 1373 takes measures to combat international terrorism 
like the freezing of bank accounts and assets, the installation of effective border controls 
and in particular the denial of safe haven to terrorists, it does not speak of concrete 
military measures against the states that harbour terrorists. Instead the resolution refers 
to (national) criminal or police measures which rather supports the interpretation that 
terrorists should be treated as ordinary criminals since only states can be the 
addressees of the obligation to implement those measures.269  
In total, the wording and structure of the resolutions support the view that the right to 
self-defence cannot be exercised against non-state actors.  
A third argument that is in favour of the traditional view requiring an armed attack by a 
state or attribution to a state can be deduced from the systematic context of the UNC.  
Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC prohibits the use of force among members of the UN. 
According to Art. 4 para. 1 of the UNC, only states can become members of the UN. 
Therefore, it would be impossible for a non-state actor to violate this prohibition. If the 
right to self-defence in Art. 51 of the UNC is to constitute the exception to the prohibition 
on the use of force, then Art. 51 of the UNC must allow the use of force, provided that 
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the attacker has already committed a breach of the prohibition on the use of force.270 If 
an armed attack constitutes at least a violation of the prohibition on the use of force, 
then logic requires that an armed attack can only derive from a state.271 
Hence, in summary it is established that the resolutions 1368, 1373 and 1438 do not 
constitute a right to self-defence against a non-state actor. 
2. Jurisprudence of the ICJ 
A further argument that supports the traditional interstate view is the settled 
jurisprudence of the ICJ. After 9/11 the ICJ confirmed in four cases that the right to self-
defence pursuant to Art. 51 of the UNC requires an armed attack by a state. 
In 2003 the ICJ upheld its findings from Nicaragua in Oil Platforms.272  In this case Iran 
instituted proceedings against the US because the latter had attacked and destroyed 
three offshore oil production complexes, owned and operated for commercial purposes 
by the National Iranian Oil Company. The ICJ held again that a lawful act of self-
defence requires an armed attack by another state.273 In the case of a private attack, 
the attack must be attributable to another state.274  
One year later, in 2004, the ICJ affirmed this position in Palestinian Wall.275 The UN 
General Assembly requested an advisory opinion of the ICJ regarding the construction 
of a wall by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory. The Court once more pointed out 
that Art. 51 of the UNC recognises the inherent right to self-defence in the case of an 
armed attack on one state by another state.276  
In Armed Activities, in 2005 the ICJ decided that Uganda did not prove that the DRC 
was sponsoring anti-Uganda rebels that were frequently attacking Uganda, operating 
from the territory of the DRC and therefore held that the attacks of the rebels were not 
attributable to the DRC.277 Sadly, it ruled, thus that it was not necessary to examine the 
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circumstances under which ‘international law provides for a right of self-defence against 
large-scale attacks by irregular forces.’278  
In 2007 in the Genocide Case the ICJ stuck to its traditional jurisprudence. It had to 
decide about the application of the Genocide Convention to the massacre in Srebrenica 
committed by units of the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska and about the 
question if the acts committed by the Bosnian Serb Army are attributable to Serbia. The 
Court answered the latter question in the negative and affirmed the ‘effective control-
test’ explicitly as the applicable standard of attribution.279  
3. Interim Conclusion 
The examination has shown that the stronger arguments are in support of the traditional 
approach that requires the attribution of an armed attack to a state. Neither the SC 
resolutions 1368, 1373 and 1438 nor the jurisprudence of the ICJ after 2001 allow for 
another interpretation. Therefore, under current international law there is no right to self-
defence against non-state actors. A new legal framework governing the defensive use 
of force has not emerged (yet).  
II. Does the current status of international law meet today’s challenges? 
The UNC including Art. 51 was drafted in 1945 when international law was a purely 
state-centred system.280 Not only were states the major players in the legal system at 
that time, they were the only players. Individuals or private entities did not play a role. 
Consequently, Art. 51 of the UNC was sketched to give a state that was attacked by 
another state a lawful instrument to defend itself because this was, what was required at 
that time.  
But the times have changed. The system in international law is shifting from a state-
centred system to one that also takes individuals into consideration.281 The field of 
human rights and the field of international criminal law are worth mentioning in this 
regard. Nowadays, attacks by non-state actors like terrorist organisations pose a much 
greater threat to international peace and security than attacks by states. Today’s 
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terrorist organisations are perfectly organised, very well equipped and have better 
financial resources than some states. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that more 
and more states are struggling to maintain internal order and to control their territory 
effectively. These weak states frequently become a safe haven for terrorist 
organisations (so called host states). 
The current legal system of attribution does not meet the requirements of this new 
threat scenario because of the ‘effective-control-test’ making attribution to the host state 
exceedingly difficult. The high standard was somewhat softened by the ‘overall control-
test’ but also this test has proven to be impractical. State practice after 9/11 is 
inconsistent but it is meaningful inasmuch as it shows that states have reacted to the 
inadequacy of the current legal framework by applying a lower threshold of attribution. 
Before 9/11 the dominant view was that attacks of terrorists were only attributable to the 
host state, making it thereby the target of defensive use of force, if the host state 
exercised some sort of control over the terrorists. Whether one applied the ‘effective 
control-test’ or the ‘overall control-test’, both approaches set out a relatively high 
standard, requiring either precise instructions over specific conduct or at least the retain 
of an all-embracing general control. 
After or since 9/11 it is not clear pursuant to which standard or rules the necessary 
attribution has to be made. States have tended to use a much lower threshold of 
attribution, invoking in principle the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine but without explicit 
reference to it or without an application of defined criteria. 
Looking at the ‘effective control-test’, the ‘overall control-test’ and finally the Unwilling or 
Unable-Doctrine, one can clearly see that the threshold for attribution was set down 
lower and lower.  
If the right to self-defence should not lose its validity there must be a lawful way in which 
a state can defend itself when it gets attacked by a terrorist organisation that operates 
from another state’s territory, with or without the consent of that other state. 
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III. A new standard of attribution 
The following section aims at elaborating a new standard of attribution based on the 
Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine. By establishing a definition of the terms ‘unwilling’ and 
‘unable’ (in the sense of the doctrine), the doctrine should gain a clearer contour and 
determined parameters. Another difficulty will be to strike the balance between the 
security interests of the attacked state and the territorial interests of the host state. In 
order to solve this tension, preconditions based on the existing law will have to be 
worked out under which the attacked state’s right to self-defence prevails over the host 
state’s territorial integrity. 
1. Shortcomings of the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine 
Having already explained the emergence and the content of the doctrine in chapter 
three. I will now illustrate which shortcomings it has.  
The doctrine’s major shortcoming and the main reason why it is criticised, is its high 
level of generality.282 As I have already mentioned, there is no established definition of 
the criteria ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’.283 What factors must a state consider when it 
evaluates the host state’s unwillingness or inability? The doctrine therefore suffers from 
‘substantive indeterminacy’ since the parameters are not clear.284 Although many 
aspects in the use of force area are unclear, for example, what constitutes an armed 
attack, because of this lack of clarity, the doctrine is not able to provide guidance for 
states as well as it could do. This is demonstrated very well by the inconsistent and 
disrupted state practice after 9/11. This dissertation will try to provide some parameters 
in order to make the doctrine more precise.  
Another reason why some commentators view the doctrine with scepticism is the risk of 
abuse that the doctrine entails. It is argued that the weak host states are more or less 
entirely at the mercy of the powerful attacked states.285  
Against this, there are mainly two arguments. Firstly, state practice has shown that it is 
not always powerful states like the US, Russia or Israel that invade in other states but 
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also states that are not necessarily considered superpowers like Kenya, Colombia or 
Ethiopia. Secondly, it is true that the unwilling or unable-doctrine can be abused by 
states but this alone is not a good reason for not having a rule at all. States have always 
violated and still constantly violate international law, in every filed. Rosalyn Higgins has 
argued, in the context of humanitarian intervention, that:  
Many writers argue against the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention today. 
They make much of the fact that in the past the right has been abused. It 
undoubtedly has. But then so have there been countless abusive claims to the 
right to self-defence. That does not lead us to say that there should be no right of 
self-defence today. We must face the reality that we live in a decentralized 
international legal order, where claims may be made either in good faith or 
abusively. We delude ourselves if we think that the role of norms is to remove the 
possibility of abusive claims ever being made.286 
Hence, the best way to avoid abuse is to make the doctrine more accurate and to give 
states in this way clear guidance for determining when a state is unwilling or unable. 
In theory, the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine should function as an useful control on the 
defensive use of force by an attacked state outside of its own territory, but only with a 
clear legal content will it be able to fulfil this function. This dissertation tries to provide 
that content. 
2. A new approach: a clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine 
This section of the dissertation introduces a new standard of attribution in the form of a 
clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine.  
A clarification of the doctrine will bring several advantages. First of all, it will provide 
guidelines for the attacked state as well as the host state. A clearer doctrine with 
transparent parameters ensures that both states know what to do and how to assess 
the respectively other state’s behaviour. But above that, it will help states in general to 
deal with attacks of terrorist organisations, to assess the attacked state’s and the host 
state’s behaviour and to react to such attacks appropriately and lawfully. And finally, a 
clarification of the doctrine would make it more legitimate in the eyes of states.287 The 
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clearer or the more determined a norm is, the more, states are willing to comply with 
it.288 As reported by Franck: 
Determinacy seems the most important [aspect of legitimacy], being that quality 
of a norm that generates an ascertainable understanding of what it permits and 
what it prohibits. When that line becomes unascertainable, states are unlikely to 
defer opportunities for self-gratification. The rule’s compliance pull evaporates.289 
In the current situation in which no one really knows what the legal situation is and what 
the requirements are it is very difficult for states to act lawfully even though they want it.  
Firstly, it must be emphasized that the clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine applies 
only to host states hosting non-state actors in the form of terrorist organisations. The 
state practice that was analysed in the third chapter has clearly shown that the situation 
in which states have invoked the Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine, sometimes more, 
sometimes less explicitly, was always the same. A state suffered from (an) attack(s) of a 
non-state actor and claimed it was attacked by ‘terrorists’. Even though there is no 
generally accepted definition of terrorism, state practice has shown that the Unwilling or 
Unable-Doctrine is exclusively linked to attacks by non-state actors that were called 
terrorist attacks. This dissertation thus uses the definition of terrorism that was 
elaborated by the SC.290 According to the SC terrorism are: 
Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as in the international conventions and protocols relating 
to terrorism.291 
Secondly, the underlying idea of the clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine is, that states 
are under a due diligence obligation towards other states or the international community 
to act against terrorists. This very general due diligence obligation derives from 
numerous international counter-terrorism obligations. This dissertation will try to give an 
idea of how this general due diligence obligation looks like and, based on that, to 
elaborate a definition of inability and unwillingness.  
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Traditionally, due diligence has required states to take preventive action regarding harm 
that is foreseeable.292 However, this standard does not fit in the present context. If the 
host state were to prevent the terrorist organisation from attacking other states there 
would be no armed attack on the attacked state and therefore the question if and how to 
exercise the right to self-defence would not come up at all. But due diligence is a 
standard that varies according to the context.293 As the International Tribunal of the Law 
of the Sea held in the Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion ‘The content of “due diligence” 
obligations may not easily be described in precise terms. Among the factors that make 
such a description difficult is the fact that “due diligence” is a variable concept. It may 
change over time as measures considered sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may 
become not diligent enough in light, for instance, of new scientific or technological 
knowledge. It may also change in relation to the risks involved in the activity.’294 
The standard varies as well in the context of common but differentiated 
responsibilities.295 It is generally accepted that developing states are usually not able to 
control the activities on their territory in the same way that developed states can and 
that this will have an impact on the evaluation of whether they have breached their due 
diligence obligation or not.296 
The international legal order is constructed around the concept of states.297 States are 
sovereign and equal and bear international rights and duties. It is generally assumed 
that states are willing and able to adhere to legal rules and fulfil their international 
obligations.298 One of their obligations is to fight terrorism. By now, as I will show below, 
states have numerous counter-terrorism obligations under international law. In general it 
can be expected from a sovereign state to fulfil these counter-terrorism obligations as 
sovereignty entails responsibility.299 Besides, as I have shown above, state practice 
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indicates that states seem to link unwillingness or inability to the adherence to 
international or sovereign responsibilities.300  
a. Obligations under international law 
As mentioned before, due diligence is a standard that varies according to the context. It 
is held therefore, that, the content of the due diligence obligation depends on the 
counter-terrorism obligation that it derives from.  
These counter-terrorism obligations derive primarily from SC resolution 1373 but also 
from the 16 international counter-terrorism legal instruments.301 Of course only states 
that are a party to these legal instruments are concerned with the fulfilment of the 
respective obligations, although, the rate of adherence has increased significantly after 
9/11.302 Round about two-third of UN member states have either ratified or acceded to 
at least 10 of the16 instruments and there is no state that has neither signed nor 
become a party to at least one of them.303 
On the other hand, the counter-terrorism obligations that resolution 1373 imposes on 
states are to be found in the operative part of the resolution and are thus binding on all 
UN member state. 
Resolution 1373 mainly obligates states to cooperate with each other and to exchange 
information regarding terrorist activities.304 Furthermore, it prohibits the financial support 
of terrorist organisations by obligating states to prevent and suppress the financing of 
terrorist acts, to criminalise the wilful provision or collection of funds by their nationals or 
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in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge 
that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts or to freeze funds and other 
financial assets, e.g. provision no. 1 a), b), c) and d) of the resolution. 
Hence, in this context, the host state has, for example, the due diligence obligation to 
investigate about funds and assets that are used or should be used for committing 
terrorist acts.  
More detailed obligations regarding the suppression of the financing of terrorists are to 
be found in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism.305 
But host states usually do not financially support terrorist organisations. While this might 
be the case from time to time, the main support that host states give is simply the 
provision of their territory.  
By letting a terrorist organisation operate undisturbed from their territory, the host states 
violate, for instance, the provisions regarding the obligations to cooperate with other 
states in order to prevent terrorist attacks. These provisions are contained in no. 3 of 
resolution 1373. Moreover, a host state that provides a safe haven for terrorists violates 
the resolution’s provision no. 2 b), which obligates the host state to take the necessary 
steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning 
to other states by exchange of information; provision no. 2 c), that obligates to deny 
safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe 
havens; as well as provision no. 2 d), which constitutes the obligation to prevent those 
who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories 
for those purposes against other states or their citizens. 
But it is not only treaty law or a SC resolution that obligates states to fight terrorism. It is 
a general and well-recognised principle in international law that each state has the 
‘obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
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other states’306. Already in 1949, the ICJ held that in Corfu Channel. Use in this context 
covers the planning, threatening, perpetrating or preparing of an armed attack.307 
So, even in the case where a host state is not a party to one of the counter-terrorism 
instruments, or (theoretically) not even a member state of the UN, it would still have the 
obligation not to provide a safe haven for terrorist organisations.  
From these counter-terrorism obligations arises, inter alia, the host state’s due diligence 
obligation to monitor its territory. If it then finds out about a terrorist organisation that is 
based on its territory, the host state is under the due diligence obligation to locate them, 
as well as disarm and arrest them. Another due diligence obligation regarding the 
warning or informing of other states, is for instance to install reliable communication 
mechanism that ensure that the gathered information are given to the other state(s).  
b. Definition of inability 
This section introduces a definition of inability under the clarified Unwilling or Unable-
Doctrine.  
So, when can a host state be considered unable? 
Starting point in this regard must also be the above listed international counter-terrorism 
obligations and the due diligence obligations resulting from them. 
In determining the inability of a host state, only the objective side is decisive. The 
subjective side does not play a role. An unable host state may want to comply with its 
due diligence obligations and its international counter-terrorism obligations or it may not 
want to but the crucial factor is its (objective) ability to do so. 
An unable host state does not have the means to comply with its due diligence 
obligations and in this way its international counter-terrorism obligations. It is not 
capable of monitoring its territory or of locating and arresting terrorists. It is not capable 
of installing communication mechanisms and inform other states about terrorist activities 
on its territory. 
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The following section aims at showing how and why a host state is incapable of 
exercising its due diligence.  
One important factor is control. For instance, if the terrorist organisation controls a 
(more or less large) part of the host state’s territory, the host state is not capable of 
exercising effectively its territorial sovereignty over that part. It will therefore also not be 
capable to monitor this part of territory and/or locate the terrorists in there and arrest 
them. Hence, because of the loss of control over parts of its territory it is incapable of 
exercising its due diligence.   
Another factor apart from control is influence. For instance, where a terrorist 
organisation exercises a significant influence on political decisions and/or government 
business, it might impossible for the host state to inform other states about the terrorist 
activities. In this regard it should be mentioned that the terrorist’s influence on the host 
state must be in such a way that it is noticeable.  
The host state can also be regarded as incapable to comply with its due diligence and 
its counter-terrorism obligations when its judicial or political or administrative system has 
collapsed, for example due to internal riots or tensions.308  
An additional reason why a host state can be considered not capable to comply is 
because it lacks personal and/or material resources or the necessary judicial 
infrastructure to fulfil its due diligence obligations as well as its international 
obligations.309   
Hence, a host state can be regarded as unable, if it obviously, that means without 
extensive research, does not have the means to comply with its due diligence 
obligations and in this way its international counter-terrorism obligations regardless of its 
subjective willingness to comply.  
After the explanations above one might think that it is not fair to declare a weak state 
unable and make it in that way the target of defensive force used by the attacked state. 
Thus, it should be clarified, that main or the core due diligence obligation of these weak 
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and unable states is to seek help or at least to accept help when offered to them.310 
Each state has the obligation to do everything it can to fight terrorism. And if a host state 
finds itself in a situation where it is no longer capable of controlling effectively its territory 
or of protecting its own citizens from terrorist attacks or of exercising its sovereign 
governmental powers it has the duty to seek help, either from the UN or from other ally 
states.  
c. Definition of unwillingness 
As opposed to the inability of a host state, its unwillingness has an objective as well as 
subjective side. Actually, the subjective side plays a big role in determining the 
unwillingness of a host state.  
Objectively, a host state is unwilling if it violates its due diligence obligations and does 
not comply with its international counter-terrorism obligations, although it could do so. 
Hence, the precondition for unwillingness is, that the host state is generally able to fulfil 
its international obligations. It has the capacities and resources to comply with them. 
Subjectively, the unwillingness of a host state requires the intentional decision to act in 
the just described way. That means the host state willingly violates its due diligence 
obligation and in this way its counter-terrorism obligation although it knows that it could 
comply with both of them. The unwilling host state knows that it has the means to 
investigate, to monitor, to locate, to disarm, to arrest etc. but it decides not to do so. 
It can thus be held that, under the clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine, a host state is 
unwilling, if it, objectively has the means to comply with its due diligence obligations and 
in this way its international counter-terrorism obligations and subjectively, it makes the 
deliberate decision not to comply.  
d. Interim Conclusion 
The previous three sections tried to provide some criteria that make the Unwilling or 
Unable-Doctrine more accurate and help to understand when a host state can be 
considered unable or unwilling.  
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The crux of the matter are the international counter-terrorism obligations and the due 
diligence obligations that derive from them, above all the obligation not to provide a safe 
haven for terrorist organisations. The host state can be considered unable if it obviously 
does not have the means to comply with its due diligence and its counter-terrorism 
obligations even though it might want to. On the other hand, it can be considered 
unwilling, if it deliberately does not exercise its due diligence and fulfil its counter-
terrorism obligations although it objectively has the means to do so. 
3. The tension between the right to self-defence of the attacked state and the 
territorial sovereignty of the host state 
Even if there is a clearer picture of this doctrine now, this does not resolve the problem 
that the right to self-defence of the attacked state and its security interest clash with the 
territorial sovereignty and the territorial interests of the host state.  
State sovereignty is a fundamental principle in international law but it is not absolute.311 
Therefore, it is submitted that in such a case, international law requires, that the 
defensive use of force, in order to be justified, should additionally fulfil the following 
preconditions. If these preconditions are fulfilled the attacked state is allowed to use 
defensive force against the host state because its security interest prevails over the 
territorial sovereignty and the territorial interest of the host state.  
a. Relevant preconditions for the defensive use of force 
The basic prerequisite is of course that the action of self-defence is in accordance with 
international law. That means, inter alia that the self-defence action is proportional to 
the armed attack and necessary to respond to it.312  
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the following preconditions are applicable only 
in the case in which a host state is considered unwilling or unable, according to the 
above mentioned criteria, to take actions against a terrorist organisation that operates 
from its territory. These additional preconditions are designed for this particular case 
only in order to strike the balance between the interests of the host state and the 
attacked state and in this way, to provide more guidance for states and more legal 
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certainty. They should not be applied in every case of self-defence. Of course, basic 
principles of international law or the UNC apply also to this case. Especially the 
prohibition on the use of force, Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC and the principles of territorial 
integrity and territorial sovereignty have to be taken into account. 
Finally, I propose that there should be made a clear distinction between the unwilling 
and the unable-scenario. The decisive difference between the two scenarios is that 
unwillingness is a subjective condition, while inability is something objective. In the 
unwilling-scenario the host state makes the decision not to comply with its international 
counter-terrorism obligations deliberately or deliberately violates international law. The 
unwilling state thus bears a certain responsibility for the terrorist activities on its territory. 
A state that is unable, on the other hand, has usually ran into difficulties through no fault 
of its own. Normally factors like mismanagement, poverty, civil wars etc. made that state 
entering into a crisis and therefore vulnerable to be used as a safe haven by terrorist 
organisations. Of course it is debatable whether such factors are based on the state’s 
fault but the unlawfulness that both types of states are carrying out, is significantly 
higher in the case of an unwilling state than in the case of an unable state. The following 
section will show that the preconditions sometimes work differently or have different 
effects in the two scenarios.  
   aa. Unilateral military action as means of last resort 
The first precondition is that unilateral military action should be the last resort. That 
means that all diplomatic and other peaceful measures must have been exhausted 
unsuccessfully and no other effective measures are reasonably accessible.313 
Diplomatic measures in this context involve, first of all, a request by the attacked state 
to the host state to take actions against the terrorist organisation. Even if the attacked 
state has made requests before, there should be one final request to act. Above that, 
diplomatic measures include all good faith attempts to obtain the host state’s consent to 
take military actions against the terrorist organisation und thereby, against the territorial 
integrity of the host state as well.314 Furthermore, the attacked state should try to get the 
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SC involved in order to get an authorisation of its planned use of defensive force under 
chapter VII of the UNC.  
The request for consent should give the host state the opportunity to agree to an 
effective and appropriate plan of action and, in the case of an unwilling host state, to 
take such action itself.315 In this way, the unwilling host state is given the chance to 
reconsider its position and to get back to international law. The unable state will 
apparently not be capable to take such action itself. 
This should be seen as the general rule. Of course, there are also exceptions to this 
rule. There might be situations in which it cannot be required from the attacked state to 
seek consent.  
This is especially true for the unwilling-scenario. A state that is unwilling to take action 
against a terrorist organisation on its territory will probably refuse to give its consent to 
the attacked state to fight these terrorists. Generally, it should be asked for its consent 
nevertheless. However, there are exceptional cases. For instance, the attacked state 
will not have to ask for consent, when there is a reasonable and objective basis to 
believe that the host state is cooperating with the terrorist organisation.316 The same 
goes for the case where the unwillingness of the host state is so obvious that it would 
not make sense to seek consent because it is clear that the host state will refuse. In 
such a situation the request for consent would be pointless. 
In the case where a host state is unable to address the terrorist activities on its territory 
but refuses nonetheless to give its consent to the attacked state, it could be considered 
rather unwilling than unable. As I have already mentioned before, a host state that is 
unable to act against the terrorists on its territory is under the obligation to seek help or 
to accept help when offered. 
The requirement that unilateral military action must be the last resort, arises on the one 
hand from the prohibition on the use of force, Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC and the 
fundamental principle that all UN member states ‘shall settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
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are not endangered’, Art. 2 para. 3 of the UNC. Both, Art. 2 para. 3 as well as Art. 2 
para. 4 of the UNC show that under the system of the UNC, the use of unilateral military 
force is only permitted in very exceptional cases.317 Self-defence is one of these 
exceptional cases.318 Nevertheless, even in the case in which a state gets attacked by 
terrorists that operate from the host state’s territory it seems to be appropriate, that 
means in accordance with the fundamental principles of the UNC, that the attacked 
state first requests the host state to take action against the terrorists on its territory 
before it uses defensive military force against the host state.  
Before the attacked state uses unilateral defensive force it should try to get the 
authorisation of the UN SC under chapter VII of the UNC. This takes the basic principle 
of the UNC into account that military force is the monopoly of the SC.319 The SC has 
proved to be capable to act very quickly if there is consensus on the matter. This was 
for example the case with resolution 660320 which condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
The SC adopted the resolution on the same day as the invasion.  
Only in cases in which the attacked state urgently must react to an armed attack and it 
is foreseeable that the SC will be blocked by vetoes, it cannot be expected that the 
attacked state first turns to the SC to seek authorisation.  
bb. Chances of success of self-defence action 
The second precondition is that the chances of success of the self-defence action are 
good.  
This is, for instance, not the case if the attacked state is missing relevant information. If 
it knows who attacked it and that these terrorists are located on the host state’s territory 
but it has no reliable military information or intelligence regarding the exact whereabouts 
of the terrorist organisation or how the terrorists are equipped, which arms they are 
carrying etc. it is extremely unlikely that the self-defence action has a good chance to be 
successful.  
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Another reason why the self-defence action can be unpromising is that the terrorist 
organisation is militarily (far) superior to the attacked state. This can be the case 
especially if the attacked state is no rich military super power.  
Also, independently from the terrorist organisation’s military capacity, a weak attacked 
state can simply be not capable to carry out a successful self-defence action because it 
lacks financial and personal resources or military know-how. In such case, the attacked 
state can seek help though and ask another state to exercise its right to collective self-
defence.  
Furthermore, the attacked state’s self-defence action might have no chances of success 
because of geographic circumstances.  
In all these cases where it would just make no sense to use defensive force against the 
terrorist organisation and thereby against the host state’s territory because the armed 
attack will most likely not be repelled successfully but the host state’s territorial integrity 
will be violated, the host state’s territorial sovereignty prevails over the attacked state’s 
right to self-defence. This is due to the fact that, firstly, a state’s territorial sovereignty 
and integrity is a fundamental right in international law and has in general to be 
respected by every other state.321 Secondly, and linked to the first point, it is one of the 
core principles of the UNC to avoid unilateral use or force against another state.322 In a 
case where such force would pointlessly violate another state’s territory although it 
might generally be covered by Art. 51 of the UNC, the territorial integrity should be given 
preference.  
   cc. Existence of convincing evidence 
The third precondition is the existence of convincing evidence. The attacked state must 
have convincing evidence that the host state is unwilling or unable to address the 
terrorist activities on its territory.  
This precondition serves to prevent a situation like the one the Bush government was in 
before and after the 2003 invasion in Iraq. The US invaded in Iraq to bring down Iraqi 
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dictator Saddam Hussein claiming that he was building weapons of mass destruction.323 
In February 2003, the American Foreign Minister at that time Colin Powell, presented 
satellite photographs, intercepts of conversations between Iraqi military officers and 
information from defectors that were supposed to prove that Saddam Hussein was 
producing nuclear weapons in the UN SC.324 The presentation did not convince the SC 
and the US invasion was later called illegal by the Secretary General at that time, Kofi 
Annan.325 The US invaded in Iraq in March 2003 nonetheless and captured Saddam 
Hussein in December 2003 but did not find any nuclear weapons.326 Later, it was 
revealed that the surveillance and satellite photos as well as other documents that the 
US brought forward as evidence were faked, partly with the knowledge of high-ranking 
US government officials.327  
This example shows how an invasion of a definitely not peaceful and democratic but 
nevertheless, sovereign state was based on faked and non-existing evidences and how 
that state was thrown into crisis through the invasion.328 In order to prevent this from 
happening again, the clarified unwilling or unable-doctrine requires that the attacked 
state has convincing evidence that, first of all, the attacking terrorist organisation is 
really operating from the host state’s territory. And secondly, that the host state is either 
unwilling to take actions or unable to do so.  
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The legal basis of this precondition can be found, again, in the prohibition on the use of 
force, Art. 2 para. 4 of the UNC and the principles of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. All UN member states are obligated to respect these fundamental principles of 
international law. Especially in the case of terrorism or after a state has been attacked 
by terrorists it is important to ensure that the attacked state does not overreact and 
defends itself militarily only if it is sure that the host state is providing a safe haven for 
terrorists. Such an overreaction might be understandable in the heat of the moment but 
must in be avoided in cases. If the attacked state has no convincing evidence that the 
terrorists are operating from the host state’s territory and the host state is indeed 
unwilling or unable, the host state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must prevail over 
the attacked state’s security interests. 
The evidence must of course be presented to and evaluated by the international 
community.329 The right organ for that would most likely be the GA. If the international 
community is not convinced, as it was in the above mentioned case with Iraq, the 
attacked state is not allowed to use defensive force against the host state.  
As there is no express standard of proof in international law 330 the strength of the 
conviction must be determined. Taking practical aspects like the time between the 
armed attack and the planned self-defence action or the collection of evidence into 
consideration, it is submitted that an absolute conviction of the international community 
is not required. This would be unrealistic and for the attacked state impossible achieve. 
In fact, a valuable level of certainty that leaves the international community without 
strong doubts muss be reached.331  
   dd. Awareness of the host state 
The last precondition that must be fulfilled is a subjective one. It is required that the host 
state is aware of the help it is providing for the terrorist organisation.332 If the host state 
does not know or cannot know that a terrorist organisation is based on its territory and 
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commits an armed attack from there it must not be subject to the defensive force of the 
attacked state.333 Again here, we must differentiate between an unwilling and an unable 
host state. 
The situation is pretty straight forward in the unwilling-scenario. A host state that 
knowingly lets a terrorist organisation operate from its territory and does not put an end 
to these activities is well aware of its support for this organisation. In such a case this 
precondition is easily fulfilled.  
The situation can be much more difficult in the unable-scenario. A state whose system 
has (even if only partially) collapsed or that is plagued by internal riots and tensions and 
that has, as a consequence, lost effective control over (parts of) its territory will most 
probably not know what exactly is happening in these non-controlled parts. So it might 
be the case that an unable state is not aware of the illegal use of its territory.  
The ICJ held in Corfu Channel that in general a state is responsible for illegal activities 
happening on its territory.334 However, it limited this principle by stating: ‘[…] it cannot 
be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and 
waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act 
perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the 
authors.’335 
If that is true for a state that exercises effective control over its territory, it must be even 
truer for a state who has lost effective control over its territory.  
Therefore, it can only be required that the unable state exercises its due diligence.336 In 
the present context, this means, does the unable state know or does it must know that a 
terrorist organisation is using its territory.  
So, in general it can be said that the unable state must inform itself as far as possible 
about what activities take place on its territory. But the determination of the exact 
content of the due diligence obligation that the unable state bears has to be made 
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specifically according to the particular facts and circumstances of each individual 
case.337 
b. Interim Conclusion 
Although this dissertation develops a definition of when a host state is actually unwilling 
or unable, this does not solve the tension between the right to self-defence of the 
attacked state and the territorial integrity of the host state. For this purpose the above 
mentioned four preconditions were proposed based on the existing rules and principles 
of international law. They help to strike the balance in each individual case. Only if all 
diplomatic measures were exhausted unsuccessfully, the self-defence action has good 
chances for success, the attacked state has convincing evidence against the host state 
and the host state is aware of its support for the terrorist organisation, the attacked state 
is allowed to exercise its right to self-defence against the terrorist organisation and 
violate in this way the host state’s territorial integrity.  
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E) Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Summing up it can be said that even after the attacks of 9/11 it is still the prevailing view 
in international law that an armed attack must originate from a state or in the case of an 
attack by a non-state actor, the attack must be attributable to a state. The jurisprudence 
of the ICJ after the 9/11 attacks has proven that and this did not change through SC 
resolutions 1368, 1373 and 1438.  
On the basis of this result, it can be established that the attack in Paris cannot be 
attributed to Syria under the current rules of attribution, no matter which test or doctrine 
one applies. Especially under the, by the ICJ still favoured, ‘effective control-test’ 
attribution to Syria is not possible. And that is exactly the (general) problem with the 
‘effective control-test’, attribution is possible but only in theory. The standard that this 
test sets, is so high that in reality states were not and will not be able to proof effective 
control of a host state over a terrorist organisation. Irregular warfare poses just as grave 
a threat to international peace and security as traditional warfare. Therefore, the 
‘effective control-test’ is extremely out of touch with reality and is not able to meet the 
challenges that today’s terrorist attacks represent. Even though the ‘overall control-test’ 
makes attribution easier, it is also not the adequate answer to the new threat scenario 
that terrorist attacks are posing.  
Since the attack is not attributable to Syria, there is no armed attack by Syria and thus, 
France has no right to self-defence against Syria. 
Thus it is hardly surprising that, state practice of the last 15 years has shown that states 
do not apply the tests anymore. A lower threshold is applied, namely the Unwilling or 
Unable-Doctrine. The major problem with this doctrine is, however, that it is highly 
indeterminate. In its current form it has no clear legal content and no defined 
parameters. One reason for that is surely the lack of a general definition of ‘armed 
attack’ and a general definition of ‘terrorism’.  
Thus this dissertation provides a new approach in form of a clarified Unwilling or 
Unable-Doctrine. The underlying idea of the clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine is that 
states are under due diligence obligations towards other states. This due diligence 
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obligations derive from the numerous international counter-terrorism obligations and 
vary according to the respective counter-terrorism obligation. The core counter-terrorism 
obligation in the present context is every state’s obligation not to permit anyone 
intentionally to use its territory for acts that violate another state’s rights.  
Therefore, under the clarified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine, a host state is unwilling if it, 
objectively has the means to comply with its due diligence obligations and in this way its 
international counter-terrorism obligations and subjectively, it makes the deliberate 
decision not to comply. As opposed to this, a host state is unable, in the meaning of the 
doctrine, if it obviously, that means without extensive research, does not have the 
means to comply with its due diligence obligations and in this way its international 
counter-terrorism obligations regardless of its subjective willingness to comply. 
But even after the clarification of the doctrine, there is still a tension between the right to 
self-defence of the attacked state and the territorial integrity of the host state. This 
tension can be mitigated on the basis of four preconditions. These preconditions are, 
that the unilateral military action is a mean of last resort, the chances of success of the 
self-defence action are good, the attacked state must have convincing evidence that the 
host state is unwilling or unable and the host state is aware of its support for the terrorist 
organisation. Only if these four preconditions are met, the attacked state’s right to self-
defence prevails over the territorial integrity of the host state, which means that the 
attacked state is allowed to defend itself with unilateral military force against the host 
state. 
One can definitely argue now that the modified Unwilling or Unable-Doctrine is still too 
indeterminate. In this respect it should be underlined that there will not be and there 
should not be a one-size-fits-all-solution.338 Some of the parameters have to stay 
somewhat malleable in order to give the state the necessary flexibility and to make the 
doctrine applicable to each individual case.339  
But apart from that, the current legal situation in which the standard of attribution is 
totally unclear, is really unsatisfactory. Non-state actors in general and terrorist 
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organisations in particular play an increasingly important role in the world. Thus, the 
international community would be well-advised to find an appropriate legal solution for 
the new rules of attribution now and not only after another horrible terrorist attack has 
occurred and our ability to make clear and lawful rules is diminished by panic and 
emotion.  
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